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Abstract
Although refugees and registered asylum-seekers have a legal right to work in South
Africa, research shows that prevailing anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion of these
documents by South African employers makes employment extraordinarily difficult to
acquire. Drawing from literature on both South Africa’s refugee rights policies and its
informal sector, this thesis investigates how in the face of such challenges, forced
migrants in Cape Town secure their day-to-day livelihoods. The research is based on
semi-structured, open-ended interviews with thirty-two refugees and other forced
migrants who live and operate in the Cape Town area, as well as five key informant
interviews with employees of refugee service organizations. The research finds that in
order to even survive, participants must use a wide ‘portfolio’ of tactics – including
moving between the formal and informal sectors, and drawing upon ethnic and
community connections in order to locate work and gain a toehold in the South African
economy.
Keywords: asylum seeker, Cape Town, entrepreneurship, forced migrant, informal
economy, livelihood, migration, refugee, South Africa, xenophobia
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

‘The future of the world is unquestionably urban, and the trajectory of
displacement is moving in the same direction’ - Jacobsen, 2005, 40.

1.1. Introduction
This research focuses on the livelihoods of forced migrants working outside the
framework of formal employment. In an effort to understand the complex ways that
these forced migrants meet their daily needs, two linked questions guided my
interviewing and analysis: First, what forms of employment or other income-generating
activities do those engaged in the informal sector use to secure their livelihoods? And
second, what are the economic, social and spatial factors that enable this employment?

It is important to explain two key terms at the outset. First, I employ the term ‘forced
migrant’ in lieu of the much tidier ‘refugee’. The reasoning for this is more fully
explained in sections 1.6, but briefly, the definition of a ‘refugee’ has become a static,
and out-dated term, which, particularly in the South African context, excludes those
migrants, who, though forcibly displaced, may not be able to access or obtain asylum
seeker or refugee status. Therefore, I employ the term ‘forced migrant’ rather than
‘refugee’ to reflect a diverse set of migrants that includes asylum seekers, refugees,
those registered as visitors or using a ZDP 1 and those without legal documentation.
Secondly, I employ the term ‘informal labourers’ to refer to individuals that are engaged
in unstable work, whether as casual labourers without a formal contract, or as selfemployed entrepreneurs.

1

The ZDP permit lasted for four years (2010-2014), and was meant to regularize the
status of Zimbabweans living in South Africa either illegally, or as asylum seekers. It
provides permit holders with the right to live, work and study in South Africa.
1

Although current South African legislation reflects a refugee policy that includes legally
recognized refugees as equal stakeholders in South African society, lack of access to the
Department of Home Affairs to apply for refugee status, difficulty in accessing South
Africa’s banking system and the perception that foreigners ‘steal jobs’ ensure that in
practice, many forced migrants, including legally recognized refugees, experience
difficulty finding employment in the formal economy (CoRMSA, 2009; Landau, 2009;
Mawadza 2008; Polzer & Landau 2008). This inability to access employment in the
formal labour market drives many into the informal economy (Smit & Rugunanan,
2014). Perhaps in reaction to this, participants engage in a kind of ‘identity economics’
(Meagher, 2010), drawing upon shared nationality and ethnicity to access job
opportunities, loans, and shared housing. It is this social connection to others, more than
income, previous employment or skills, which helps to afford some measure of
protection to the research participants from the financial and social uncertainty that
governs their existence.

1.2 Context
Despite the majority of displaced people worldwide living in urban areas (Jacobsen,
2005), academic literature considering refugees in Africa focuses disproportionately on
those living in formal camps (Bakewell, 2008; Gladden, 2012). However, unlike many
other countries in Africa, South Africa contains no refugee camps. This makes all
refugees in the country de facto ‘urban refugees’, many of whom find themselves in
complex urban environments like Johannesburg and Cape Town (Vearey, 2008). While
obtaining exact numbers for forced migrants is a difficult and politically complicated
matter (Jacobsen, 2006) South Africa is host to one of the largest populations of asylum
seekers in the world, with the UNHCR estimating that 243, 948 asylum seekers, and 65,
668 refugees currently reside in South Africa (2014). While refugees living in camps
are forced to rely on humanitarian relief (Wagacha & Guiney, 2008), displaced persons
living in South Africa are expected to become self-sufficient by integrating with their
host population and earning a living (Landau, 2006).

2

Within the literature surrounding forced migration, scholars alternate between two
positions: that forced migrants are vulnerable individuals in need of social support (c.f
Rolfe et al, 1987); and, more currently, a guarded suggestion that urban and self-settled
forced migrants are resilient economic actors, capable of securing their own livelihoods,
without the support of host country and international aid (Jacobsen, 2005; Horst 2006;
Campbell et al, 2006; Omata, 2013). With these two perspectives as my guideposts, I
set out to discover how those forced migrants deriving their incomes outside of the
formal sector were faring in the Cape Town economy.
1.3 The Livelihoods Approach
In order to do this, I used the ‘livelihoods approach’. With roots stretching back to the
1960s, this framework has been described as ‘people centred, non-sectoral and
grounded in the multidimensional reality of daily life’ (Kaag, 2004: 1). One of the
earliest uses of the term ‘livelihood’ was by Evans-Pritchard in his ethnographic
investigations of the Nuer and the ways in which they made a living in the Nile Valley
(1940). The foundation of the livelihoods approach was laid by the economist Karl
Polanyi in his books The Great Transformation (1944) and The Livelihood of Man
(1977)2, wherein he proposed a break from mainstream, formalist economics towards
substantivism, a view which took a human-centred approach towards economics, and
which recognized the social, cultural and historical embedded-ness of how individuals
secure their living.
By the 1980s, the livelihoods approach was an idea whose time had come. As Structural
Adjustment Programs grew to prominence in 1980s in mainstream economic
development thinking, Polanyi’s ideas converged with growing calls amongst policy
makers and academics for a bottom-up and actor-oriented approach to development.
Throughout the 1980s, as Robert Chambers began pioneering the livelihoods approach
(Chambers, 1987; Chambers & Conway, 1992), economists turned their attentions to
2

Published posthumously
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the survival strategies of the poor as well as the informal economy (Schmink, 1984).
The economist and philosopher Amartya Sen proposed considering actors’ societal
entitlements, rather than just their property, as a way of understanding poverty (1981).
Sen’s later focus on capabilities (1985) as a way of paying attention to what a person is
capable of doing, and their own perceptions of what is desirable, joined with James C.
Scott’s analysis of Malaysian peasants’ resistance to dominance through techniques of
evasion (1985), further set the groundwork for an actor-centred livelihoods approach
that highlights the diversity and multidimensionality of lived poverty.

With its focus on both individual strategies and structural influence, this framework
lends itself well to considering the livelihood strategies of forced migrants who operate
within a defined legal framework. When writing about livelihoods in the refugee
context, Jacobsen defines this livelihood framework as:
… a consideration of the assets and strategies refugees use to achieve desired
outcomes, and the institutional or structural context…processes, institutions and
policies which constrains or enables access to these assets and strategies
(Jacobsen, 2006: 279).
Consideration of the institutional context in South Africa is particularly relevant, as
many migrants have difficulty accessing formal employment (Landau, 2007), and their
tendency to work in the informal sector has been linked to their difficulty in accessing
proper documentation (Crush, William & Peberdy, 2005; Landau, 2006). These issues
of access to formal employment and documentation, and the significant effect they have
on participants’ livelihoods, is considered in Chapter 3.
Although refugees ‘enjoy an independent legal personality’ from other migrants (Feller,
2005: 27), in South Africa, given the difficulty of distinguishing between voluntary and
forced migrants, discussions of refugees and forced migrants in existing research on
migration in South Africa tend to be subsumed within a broader analysis of migrants in
general (Friebel, Gallego & Mendola, 2013; Hunter & Skinner, 2003; Landau & Wa
4

Kabwe Segatti, 2009; Vearey, 2008). This thesis uses the livelihoods framework to
consider the experiences of forced migrants, as distinct from migrants as a broad
category. The livelihoods approach has been successfully applied in previous research
to examine the specific social, economic and policy contexts in which migrants and
refugees pursue their livelihoods in South Africa (De Vriese, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006;
Vearey 2008). My research on forced migrants in South Africa continues in the same
vein as these scholars, but focuses on the city of Cape Town, in the Western Cape,
rather than Johannesburg in Gauteng Province.
1.4 Research Methodology
Data was collected in the course of four months spent in Cape Town, between mid-May
and mid-September of 2013. In total, I conducted 37 interviews. Four of these were key
informant interviews with staff at the following refugee service organizations: the
African Disabled Refugee Organization (ADRO); the Agency for Refugee Education,
Skills Training and Advocacy (ARESTA); the International Organization for Migration
(IOM); and UCT’s Refugee Rights Unit (RRU). A further key informant interview was
conducted with the Director of Fundi, a not-for-profit labour placement organization.

Most importantly, I conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with forced migrants
living and working in the informal sector in the Cape Town area. Participants came
from Malawi (1), Nigeria (2), Republic of Congo (2), Somalia (4), Zimbabwe (5), and
Democratic Republic of Congo (18). Despite my best attempts to sample participants
from a variety of countries of origin and forms of employment, my participants skew
heavily towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This is due to DRCs
significant representation amongst forced migrants in the Cape Town area. In order to
make a gendered analysis possible, I made every effort to have an equal gender split
amongst participants. For reasons I will discuss in later chapters, it was more difficult to
find women respondents, and so I was only able to formally interview 13 women for
this research. Consideration of gender, and how it shapes livelihood choices and
practices, is nevertheless a foundational concept of this thesis.
5

These interviews took me all over the Greater Cape Town area, from Bellville to
Simon’s Town and Athlone. While I sometimes interviewed participants as they
worked, more often we would meet in a café over a cup of coffee to discuss migration
histories, communities both in Cape Town and internationally, and their hopes and
dreams for the future. I was occasionally invited into people’s homes, either to share a
meal or simply visit. These moments, when the recorder was not on or even present,
often led to deeper insight into how participants were patching together their
livelihoods. This accords with the feminist tradition that holds that equality, and even
friendship, between interviewers and interviewees can increase trust and lead to more
candid interactions (Kihato, 2013). The methods and tools of analysis used throughout
the thesis will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this chapter sets out some definitions and concepts that are drawn
upon throughout this thesis. Following this introductory chapter and the description of
methodology, Chapter 3 addresses the role of state structures and formal financial
institutions in the livelihoods of Cape Town’s forced migrants, particularly with respect
to South Africa’s migration regime. It delves into the nuts and bolts of the asylum
seeker application and renewal process, and how this affects forced migrants’ access to
formal banking. The chapter demonstrates that, in addition to generally lowering forced
migrants’ quality of life, several structural changes to the asylum seeking process have
severely frustrated forced migrants’ abilities to sustain a livelihood and maintain
financial stability.

Chapter 4 is devoted to detailing the kinds of employment forced migrants in Cape
Town engage in. Drawing from life histories of participants, it teases apart the
dichotomy between the formal and informal economy, in order to illustrate that
successful forced migrants draw on opportunities from both sectors in order to gain
financial stability. The chapter also highlights how country of origin, gender, and
6

previous education and skills have an impact on forced migrants’ abilities to find and
manage work in their host city.

Chapter 5 discusses the non-income related livelihood strategies of forced migrants.
This is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on the roles of community
organizations, which offer a semi-formal support network to many forced migrants. In
the second section, I focus on individual coping strategies, and draw forward the theme
of heterogeneous experiences and the concept of ‘portfolios’ in order to understand how
some participants were able to stabilize their financial position, despite fluctuating
incomes, while others continued to struggle.

In Chapter 6, my concluding chapter, I discuss the results as a whole in terms of the
wider literature around forced migrants living in South Africa, highlighting some of my
key findings, and drawing together some of the recurring themes. This chapter will also
discuss the contributions that this thesis has made to the study of migration, and present
areas for future research.

7

1.6 Background and Context
1.6.1 Definitions and Terminology
As an initial step, the meaning of various terms, such as forced migrant, asylum seeker,
failed claimant, Convention refugee and urban refugee, must be clarified. Most broadly,
a forced migrant is an individual who is engaged in movements that are ‘unplanned and
unexpected’ but who will not necessarily be officially recognized as a refugee
(Marfleet, 2007). The most widely cited definition of a refugee is the definition
contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention, which states that a refugee is a person who:
[. . .] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to, or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (Article
1)
While procedures vary from country to country, forced migrants who choose to make a
claim for asylum in a country under the 1951 Geneva Convention are called ‘asylum
seekers’. Those asylum seekers whose claims are heard and rejected are called ‘failed
claimants’ and only those who made a claim and are found to meet the criteria of the
Geneva Convention are accepted as ‘Convention Refugees’ (Castles & Miller, 2009).
While such distinctions may seem unnecessary, such classifications represent how the
process of migration is becoming ever more complex, while at the same time
demonstrates the international refugee regime’s attempts to manage newly complicated
streams of migration (Zetter, 2007). Indeed, each category of migrant comes with a
unique set of rights, and a different relationship between the individual and the state.
Overall, the bulk of the literature on displaced persons tends to focus on refugees, and
within this, the majority of analysis restricts itself to those refugees living in
internationally-run, United Nations-appointed refugee camps (Gladden, 2012) Those
refugees who live outside of camps are described as urban refugees, and are the focus
of this investigation.
8

1.6.2 Research Site: Cape Town
Like many cities worldwide,
Cape Town has experienced
extraordinary

population

growth in the past six
decades, increasing from a
population of just over 630,
000 in 1951 to 3.7 million in
2010 (Quick, 1995; City of
Cape Town, 2010). All poor
newcomers to Cape Town,
whether

forced

migrants

arriving from other parts of
the

continent,

or

South

African migrants from other
parts of the country, must
contend with the city’s long
history of economic, spatial
and racial inequality and
injustice. In Cape Town,
South Africa’s apartheid-era

Figure 1: Map of Cape Town, from McDonald, 2014: 152.

social

planning and

city’s

own

the

mountainous

geography and particular
demography have together

produced a hyper-segregated city (Western, 1996). Indeed, although Cape Town’s
economy is varied and growing, much of the wealth continues to be concentrated in the
wealthy and historically white northern and southern suburbs (de Swardt et al, 2005).
Parts of Cape Town, such as Camps Bay and Constantia, are overtly wealthy, with ice-
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cream shops, luxury hotels and fine restaurants. By contrast, Cape Town’s townships3
and informal settlements, located in the marshy, undesirable land of the Cape Flats, are
impoverished, with high unemployment, poor service delivery, and the highest murder
rates in South Africa (Lancaster, 2013).

While the end of apartheid and the beginning of universal suffrage marked a hopeful
time in history, inequality and segregation have in fact worsened since 1994, leaving
South Africa with the highest income inequality in the world (McDonald, 2014: 148).
Wealth disparity between different racial categorizations persists – with the median
income of a white South African being approximately 5.2 times that of a coloured South
African4, and 11.4 times as much as a black South African (Liebbrandt et al, 2012).
This has serious implications for Cape Town, where less than a third of residents are
black African, half are coloured, and a full 20 percent are white. This is dramatically
different from national demographics, where 80 percent of South Africans are black.
This, along with racially segregated median incomes, has contributed to Cape Town
being identified as the most unequal city in the world (McDonald, 2008).

In Cape Town’s townships and informal settlements, jobs are scarce, and service
delivery is poor. For those South Africans living in townships, mainly black and
coloured, securing their own livelihoods is difficult enough, and leads many of them
into the informal and survival sectors (de Swardt et al, 2005). The influx of migrants, in
3

In the South African context, township or location refers to the settlement areas found
on the outskirts of urban agglomerations. Created in the apartheid era to segregate nonwhite labour, townships continue today to house the majority of South Africa’s poor
black population.
4
Prior to majority rule in South Africa, segregation was divided into four categories, that
is white, Asiatic/Indian, Coloured and African. The term ‘Coloured’ is used in this
sense to refer to South Africans of mixed ancestry from Europe, Asia and Khoisan
people who originally inhabited the Cape region. While the idea of reified racial terms
is extremely problematic, these terms are still used in social science literature to talk
about the very real socio-economic differences between different populations in South
Africa created under apartheid, and for this reason, are used within this thesis as well.
10

addition to the traditionally marginalized nature of those living in Cape Town’s
townships, has further fuelled discontent, most notably in protests for short-term service
delivery (Turok & Watson, 2001).

When forced migrants arrive in Cape Town, ready to settle down, earn a good wage and
find a peaceful place to live, they do so alongside many South African citizens who,
more than twenty years after the end of apartheid, continue to be economically
disenfranchised themselves. How migrants cope with this wealth and spatial disparity,
and how they relate to South Africans that are disenfranchised like them, is examined in
detail in Chapter 5.

1.6.3 Migration to South Africa
As the only country on the continent to undergo significant industrial growth and
development,

migration

to

South Africa has changed since
the end of apartheid in 1994.
There has been an increase in
temporary

(regular

irregular)

and

cross-border

movement to South Africa and
from

its

neighbouring

countries, and South Africa

Figure 22: Map of South Africa and region, © OpenStreetMap
contributors

attracts

many

migrants

from

continent

economic
across

(Massey,

the

2006).

South Africa has also become a
destination country of asylum for asylum seekers and refugees from range of countries,
predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a dominant regional economy, South Africa is
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the heart of a new ‘migratory sub-system’, which draws migrants from across the
continent into South Africa (Massey, 2006: 57). As such, South Africa’s own path to
democracy and a more racially equal economy is tempered by the challenge of
accommodating the many migrants that move to the country’s cities both for economic
and other reasons. This is exacerbated by the fact that Southern African borders are
long, lightly policed and, because of their relatively recent colonial origins, have little
cultural meaning or significance for those living near them (Crush, Williams &
Peberdy, 2005).

When considering South Africa’s current migration situation, it is important to
understand its history of migration. More than 150 years ago, in the diamond mines of
Kimberley, South African migrant workers were joined by men recruited from the
countries now known as Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and sometimes Tanzania. In
1886, gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand, and even more cheap labour was
imported, in order to work the mines and farms of the growing settlement (Crush,
Jeeves & Yudelman. 1992). This discovery forever changed the pattern of migration in
the sub-continent, creating enduring forms of legal cross-border migration in the region
(Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005).

By 1994, black foreigners who wanted to work outside of the mining and agricultural
sector in South Africa were finally eligible to do so (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010),
and so, along with newly mobile black South Africans, were able to settle in the now
desegregated areas of the cities. Since then, migration to South Africa has become
increasingly urbanized. While some migrants still work in farms near the border and in
gold-mining towns, the urban agglomerations of Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and
Pretoria attract the majority of migrants (ibid). Long-standing patterns of circular
migration continue, but there has also been a growing trend in South Africa of crossborder migrants staying for longer periods of time, and creating chain migration by
establishing transnational households (Landau, 2008:35).

12

The end of apartheid in 1994 led to South Africa finally becoming a signatory to the
1951 Geneva Convention. In conjunction with the shifting political and social situations
in neighbouring countries, this has led to many forced migrants coming to the country to
seek asylum. In the 1990s, unrest and war in Mozambique and Angola was the main
origin of refugees. More recently, the main countries of origin for forced migrants are
Congo-Kinshasa (i.e. DRC), Somalia, and Zimbabwe. While exact numbers are difficult
to obtain, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has recorded 309,616
refugees and asylum seekers living in South Africa (UNHCR, 2013). These numbers
have swamped South Africa’s refugee determination system. There are about 300,000
claimants of which only 65,668 are recognized refugees, while 243,948 are asylum
seekers awaiting determination (UNHCR, 2015). Demographically, asylum-seekers
come to South Africa for strategic reasons, including a desire to avoid living in camps
or being restricted to non-urban, rural areas (Landau, 2008:34). The stress placed on the
refugee determination system, and the resulting chaos in South Africa’s migration
management, is discussed in Chapter 3, along with its implications for forced migrants’
livelihoods.

1.6.4 Xenophobia
This influx of cross-border migrants must be considered alongside the mobility of South
Africans themselves. Many South Africans, living in the inner-cities and informal
settlements of South Africa’s urban centres, are themselves transient or newly arrived,
and may not necessarily feel more of a sense of connection to the city than the noncitizen migrants who live among them. Added to this, while regarded as a land of
opportunity for many on the continent, South Africa remains the country with the
highest wealth disparity in the world. Many of the challenges that forced migrants face,
such as securing formal employment, dealing with crime and securing financial credit,
are challenges faced by poor South Africans as well. This can cause poor South
Africans and non-citizens to see each other as competitors in the scramble for scarce

13

material resources and economic opportunity. This is a tension that has been identified
as one of the driving factors behind xenophobia (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). Xenophobia
is a term that refers to an intense and sometimes irrational dislike of outsiders, and is an
integral part of the vocabulary used to discuss citizenship and belonging in
contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. For migrants living in South Africa,
experiences of xenophobia are a defining factor in everyday life that affects all aspects
of day-to-day existence (Crush et al., 2008; Dodson, 2010; Matsinhe, 2013).

The problem of xenophobia in South Africa, although discussed academically as early
as 1998, has gained particular relevance since the violent riots and xenophobic attacks
in May and June of 2008, which started in Alexandra township in Gauteng Province and
spread across formal and informal settlements in major cities across the country,
including Cape Town. These riots involved mass looting and the destruction of foreignowned shops and homes. Sixty people were killed and over a hundred thousand people
were made homeless (Dodson, 2010; Friebel et. al., 2013; Matsinhe, 2013). These
attacks, in addition to violent killings by public stoning and immolation, shocked the
world and South Africans alike. They cast a shadow even today; amongst forced
migrants participating in this study, the events of 2008 were often used as a signpost in
recounting their own experiences in South Africa, and held an understandable
significance in their narratives of belonging. For their part, many South Africans made
frequent reference to Mandela’s anticipated death as a possible trigger for a second
round of attacks, an event that did not come to pass. In January and February 2015,
another spurt of violence, also targeting foreign shopkeepers, broke out in parts of
Gauteng’s Soweto township. This violent outbreak of looting was sparked by the fatal
shooting of a 14-year-old boy who was caught stealing from a Somali operated spaza5
shop (Al Jazeera, 2015). Looting and riots have spread across Soweto, with Somali,
Ethiopian and Pakistani owned shops being targeted. In addition to the considerable loss
5

The term spaza shop is a commonly used in South Africa to refer to an informal
convenience store.
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of income by the destroyed shops, one Somali shopkeeper in Bloomberg was set alight
by a petrol bomb (Mail and Guardian, 2015). Such tragedies, and the underlying tension
they reflect, have become characteristic of the broken relationship between foreigners
and South Africans in South Africa’s townships.

Such is the force in the public imagination of these attacks that the academic interest in
topic of xenophobia in South Africa has since grown across a variety of different
disciplines. There is a rich vein of academic writing which debates the origins and
causes of the 2008 attacks, and similar outbreaks of xenophobic violence. But, as
Dodson notes, while the xenophobic attacks of 2008 were deeply concerning and
problematic, ‘they should not have struck anyone as a surprise’ (2010:4) as violent
encounters against foreigners had been well documented in the years leading up to the
attacks (c.f. Mattes et al. 1999). Indeed, it was not the attacks themselves that were
unanticipated, but rather their intensity and scale (Crush et al, 2008).
Migrants in South Africa live under a near-constant threat of violence of various types
and degrees. While most participants spoke of comparatively non-threatening
experiences of xenophobia – such as being referred to as makwerekwere 6 or being
threatened in joking tones, the impact of these experiences is amplified by fears of more
severe attacks, which can financially cripple targeted shop-owners. This threat, and the
general climate of hostility that many participants reported as their own experience, has
led many migrants to develop a series of coping mechanisms, which will be described
and explored in Chapter 5.

6

A term used to derogatorily refer to speakers of non-South African languages.
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2. Methodology

2.1 Introduction

The main findings for this thesis are drawn from interviews with thirty-two refugees and
other forced migrants who live and earn a livelihood in the Cape Town area. While by
no means intended to be a representative sample, effort was made to include a range of
participants, with the eventual sample representing the six different countries of
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (18), Zimbabwe (5), Somalia (4), CongoBrazzaville (2), Malawi (1) and Nigeria (2). In order to qualify for the study,
participants had to be over 18, engaged in non-formal or non-regular work, self-identify
as a forced migrant, and feel, for their own security, that they had had to emigrate.
Although their precise legal status was not determined, owing to its obvious sensitivity,
all identified themselves as forced as opposed to voluntary migrants. Respondents
included recognized refugees and formal asylum-seekers as well as migrants outside the
formal asylum and refugee determination system. These interviews were augmented by
key informant interviews (5) with refugee service providers and visits and group
discussions with community ethnic organizations.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first details the epistemological
and methodological foundations of this study. The second contains a description of my
study design, including sections detailing selection criteria, sampling and the interview
process. The third section discusses the relevant research challenges and ethical issues,
and ends in discussing my analytical processes in writing the thesis.

2.2 Epistemological and Methodological Foundations
Research in the field of migration studies adopts a wide range of theoretical,
methodological and disciplinary approaches, leading to intense and extensive debates.
This is articulated in the South African context by Jacobsen and Landau (2003), who
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call for an empirical and scientific approach to the subject, critiquing many of the smallscale projects on forced migration as haphazard and unrepresentative (2003). The more
quantitative, larger scale, survey based research, such as the research provided by the
Southern African Migration Project, has obvious benefits and produces a great deal of
information that is useful in understanding the bigger picture of migration in the region.
Yet despite the study of South Africa being ‘awash with statistics’ (Seekings, 2006: 1),
data regarding how many migrants live in South Africa has been described as ‘scanty,
patchy and skewed’ (Blaser & Landau, 2014: 15), mostly due to the country’s
inadequate data collection systems (Crush, 2011).

In partial reaction to this sentiment, Matthew Sharpe (2012) and Graeme Rodgers
(2004) amongst others have highlighted that within the field of migration in Southern
Africa, the majority of research has indeed been large scale and quantitative, and that
there has been a dearth of qualitative case studies on migrants in South Africa (Rodgers,
2004). In response to this gap, and recognizing that ‘people are the experts in their own
lives’ (Boyden & Ennew 1997: 73) this thesis uses qualitative methods, in the form of
semi-structured, in-depth interviewing, in order to recognize forced migrant
experiences.

In executing my study, I was influenced by feminist discussions of

methodology (Kobayashi, 1994; England, 1994; Sundburg, 2003; Sharp, 2005) that
argues that collaborative and personal relationships between researchers and the
communities they study can strengthen research and produce valid, co-constructed
knowledge.

Another key aspect of a feminist approach is the idea that research is not neutral, and
positionality is a key consideration. Fieldwork is ‘embodied, messy and complex’
(Sharp, 2005: 305). Who we are, and what we look like has an important and key role to
play in determining the kind and quality of information we as researchers receive
(2005). In this spirit, the following is a brief description of my personal and academic
background. I first visited Cape Town as a visiting student at the University of Cape
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Town in 2010. While I did not complete any formal fieldwork on the topic of migration
and xenophobia, my time in South Africa awakened me to some of the challenges that
African migrants living in Cape Town faced. When I returned to my undergraduate
studies at Mount Allison University, I decided to focus my Honours thesis on the
contribution that women made to the liberation struggle, and the representation of their
experiences in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These two
experiences awoke me to the tremendous political and economic transformation that the
country is currently going through.

In the following year, between my undergraduate and my graduate studies at Western, I
worked as a refugee settlement worker and human rights advocate at a Romero House, a
shelter and community centre in Toronto. Living and working with individuals in the
midst of major life changes made me witness to what a frustrating and bewildering
process the Canadian refugee determination system can be. My time at Romero House
made me aware of the interplay between institutional structures and the individual. I had
witnessed firsthand the frustration and even despair that seemingly routine bureaucratic
hurdles can produce, and I was eager to consider them more fully in an academic
context. Given my previous experience and interest in South Africa, and my new
understanding of some of the issues asylum seekers and refugees face, designing a
research project around these two research interests, in a city I was already familiar
with, seemed like a natural decision.

In Cape Town, I was, and looked like, a ‘foreign’ researcher in almost every sense of
the word. As a white, Canadian-born scholar operating out of a Canadian university, it
is clear that the research I have conducted, and the data I have produced, is the product
of, and subject to the frictions of my status as an ‘outsider’. Within the context of South
Africa, a country with a set of complicated and, to an outsider, bewildering attitudes
towards race and social status, my position as a young, female researcher from Canada,
working with forced migrants of variable legal statuses, ages, professions and countries
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of origin, has meant that a high degree of reflexivity and patience have been essential in
disentangling the web of social interaction that such research entails. In her work with
Congolese refugees living in Uganda, Clark-Kazak writes about the mzungu 7 effect.
Because foreign researchers are seen as having influence and access to resources,
participants and Ugandans would often treat her deferentially (2006: 30). While this
was not as apparent in my own research, I suspect that my status as a Western
researcher, from a country with a highly desirable refugee resettlement program, may
have lent me, and my research enquiries, more credibility than deserved (see 2.5).
While the mzungu effect had undoubted positive effects for my research, my position
may have also been beneficial for participants. Community ethnic organizations were
eager to speak to me, and wanted to use me as a mouthpiece for raising awareness about
what was happening to forced migrants living in Cape Town. These issues are explored
in greater detail in section 2.4, entitled ‘Research Challenges in the Field’.

2.3 Study Design

Data collection for this research was divided into three different stages: semi-structured
interviews with several key informants (5) and a range of individual migrants (32), and
finally, visits and discussions with local ethnic organizations (5). The following section
describes each of these stages in turn, outlining the process as well as the positives and
negatives of each method.
2.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews with Key Informants

An important preliminary stage of my research was making contact with refugee service
organizations operating in Cape Town. In my first two months in the city, I contacted

7

Mzungu is a Swahili word that literally translated means ‘European’, but is widely
used to refer to all white people in East Africa.
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ten different refugee-service and advocacy organizations8, and was able to arrange indepth interviews with five different organizations. These in-depth interviews were
designed to gain a sense of the institutional landscape as it pertains to refugees and to
gather practical information about which, and to what extent, programs support refugee
livelihoods in Cape Town.

I found that refugee-service organizations, with small budgets and staffs, are under a
great deal of pressure to provide for the needs of the many refugees living in the city. In
addition, some organizations, such as The Scalabrini Centre, are frequently approached
by students eager to interview refugees for academic credit, and are consequently
overwhelmed. Unsurprisingly, given this fact, not all organizations were willing to meet
with me for an interview. Despite this disappointment, the interviews I did manage to
secure yielded extensive information on the wider official policy and political-economic
context of refugee rights. Such interviews provided an opportunity to draw upon
informants' expertise in the sector, which played an early role in helping me understand
the links between government policies and the actions of individual participants.

Two of the organizations I worked with, The Agency for Refugee Education, Skills
Training & Advocacy (ARESTA, located in Athlone), and the Fundi Network, a nonprofit employment agency (in Mowbray), were integral in helping me with my data
collection. Both organizations not only provided very helpful information in their own
interviews, but also introduced me to potential participants, and offered their own office
space as a safe and neutral place to conduct my interviews.

This assistance

strengthened my research in two main ways. The first was in establishing trust with
participants. As the majority of interviewees were located through these two
organizations, it immediately gave me, as a researcher, more credibility than if I had
approached participants on the street. Staff members of both organizations seemed to
8

CTRC, ARESTA, ADRO, Scalabrini, PASSOP, IOM, UCT’s RRU, LHR, AFRISA,
Fundi, Catholic Welfare and Development, Adonis Musati Project
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be well liked by participants, and in vouching for me and my research intentions, they
lent a more relaxed air to the entire process which facilitated candour. This form of
introduction was also ideal because of its discretion. Potential participants were
approached and invited to be involved in the research in a space that was foreigner
positive. While on the street or public areas, a young, white woman speaking at length
with a hawker or casual labourer may possibly expose participants to unwanted
attention, conducting interviews in this office space gave another layer of privacy and
discretion to the interviews. There were some shortcomings to this approach as well.
One aspect was the relatively open layout of the Fundi office, which meant that
sometimes there was a stream of people passing through, which could occasionally
disrupt conversations. Additionally, given the presence of Fundi staff nearby and lack of
privacy, participants may have felt pressure to speak positively about Fundi and conceal
more personal details for fear of being overheard. While introductions through
ARESTA were extremely helpful in making contact with participants living outside of
Cape Town (that still used Cape Town services), this recruitment method may have
biased this part of the sample towards better connected and savvy migrants already
involved in social service programs.

2.3.2 In-depth Semi-Structured Interviews with Forced Migrants

The most data rich portion of the research process were the in-depth interviews
conducted with 32 Cape Town based forced migrants, representing men and women and
a range of neighbourhoods, livelihoods, income levels, ages, and home countries. The
in-depth interviews were designed to meet the following key objectives: (1) to gather
detailed information about the manner in which forced migrants in Cape Town earn
their livelihoods; (2) to provide background information through the exploration of
informants’ life histories, especially pertaining to their decision to leave their home
country and how they came to settle in Cape Town; (3) to identify the factors that
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enable and constrain the livelihoods of forced migrants, especially those engaged in
informal or insecure employment .

Sampling and Making Contact
In order to be included in the study, individuals had to self-identify as forced, as
opposed to voluntary migrants, and be based in the Cape Town area. Given how little is
known about their ‘numbers, profiles, status, location and livelihoods’ urban refugees
are considered a hidden population (Pavanello et al. 2010: 11), and as no sampling
frame exists from which to sample randomly, participants were chosen purposively
through reverse snowball sampling. Participants were contacted in several different
ways: 1) through introductions by way of Fundi and ARESTA; 2) ‘cold’ introductions
by approaching potential participants in public spaces such as their places of work; 3)
reverse snowball sampling from initial contacts. This process is described in greater
detail below. Given the increased precarity of migrants, special attention was paid to
ensure introductions and interviews were discreet and did not openly identify forced
migrants as such to casual passers-by.

In order to locate a range of participants from different countries and different economic
niches, and to achieve a relatively equal gender balance, I used a variety of recruitment
strategies.

Interviews with key informants at ARESTA and Fundi were essential in

providing introductions to the first set of forced migrant participants, who were
migrants using these organizations’ services. In order to locate the majority of the
remaining participants, directed snowball sampling was used from this group,
particularly to find more female participants, by emphasizing to pre-existing
participants that I was looking for participants. This method of sampling did not pick up
much momentum until the very end of my fieldwork, when I had already reached my
target interview numbers. Because snowball sampling did not prove entirely effective in
producing a diverse body of participants with different occupations, countries of origin,
or for that matter, many women, additional participants were identified and recruited
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through day-to-day conversations in the course of buying vegetables or artisanal crafts. I
would take advantage of the typical small talk that ensues in such transactions to steer
the conversation towards my research, and mention that I was looking to speak with
forced migrants about their livelihood experiences. This was an effective strategy, as it
allowed potential participants to reveal themselves as forced migrants on their own
terms, by either expressing interest in an interview, or declining the invitation by
responding or ignoring the subtle invitation.

I made initial contact with participants over the phone or in person, where I could
ensure that possible participants fit the selection criteria. Together, we would arrange an
interview place and time in an area that was already known and considered to be
convenient and safe by both parties. Interviews were either conducted at a café or
restaurant, at the participant’s place of work, or in the office spaces made available by
both ARESTA and Fundi. Interviews were conducted in English, sometimes with an
interpreter, arranged by the participant.

Inclusion Criteria
From among potential participants, I determined which of them qualified as forced
migrants by asking if the participants felt they ‘had to leave’ their country. This
question was simple by design, as it invited participants to offer their own explanation
for why they came to South Africa. In one case, this lead me to disqualify a participant
from Cameroon who explained he came to South Africa for business purposes to ‘make
it big’ and in several cases, led me to include Zimbabweans in the study who were
either on visitor’s visas, or Zimbabwean Special Dispensation permits (ZDP)9, but had
been forced to leave Zimbabwe due to the past decade of political violence, instability
and economic crisis. Although many Zimbabweans are unable to stay in Zimbabwe
safely, their situation is generally oversimplified, and framed as ‘economic migrants’ to
9

The ZDP program lasted for four years (2010-2014), and was meant to regularize the
status of Zimbabweans living in South Africa either illegally, or as asylum seekers. It
provides permit holders with the right to live, work and study in South Africa.
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South Africa. This situation of Zimbabweans in South Africa was a main reason I in
choose to employ the term ‘forced migrant’ rather than the more restrictive term
‘refugee’ in this study.

The second aspect of inclusion was spatial. Participants had to be based in the Cape
Town area. While I did not anticipate this being a problematic criterion, it was a term
that had to be slightly redefined. Originally, I envisioned this to mean participants living
in the Cape Town area, but the current bureaucratic situation caused me to revise this
criterion. Because few social services are available to refugees in the rest of the Western
and Northern Cape, asylum seekers and recognized refugees from both regions must
travel to the Cape Town area in order to receive most settlement assistance, and in order
to renew their permits at the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office. For these reasons, I
determined inclusion on a case-by-case basis. If individuals were using Cape Town
based support organizations, or were renewing their permits at the Cape Town office, I
considered them to be ‘Cape Town based’. As a result, this research draws on
interviews with participants based as far away as George – an almost five hour journey
by bus.

The third and final aspect of inclusion criteria was that participants had to be working
outside of regular, formal employment. Due to the types of labour that most foreigners
tend to engage in – working as hair stylists, tailors, hawkers and spaza shop owners, or
as a part of the casual economy, this employment tended to be much more visible than
other types of labour, and was often the easiest criteria to fill.

Interview Process
Typically, I would meet and speak with participants at least once before I returned to
conduct a formal interview. Not only did this create a better rapport from the outset of
the interview, but it also meant that, where possible, I could prepare an interview guide
with some background information about the relevant participant in mind (e.g. age,
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gender, income, place of residence, time in the country). Interviews were conducted
using an interview guide of open-ended and adaptable questions, and for those I met for
the first time during an interview, these questions were tailored to individual
participants’ characteristics and circumstances as the interview proceeded. Tailoring the
interview guides to each participant facilitated discussion of issues that were pertinent to
his or her own experience. After preliminary questions that established nationality,
livelihood strategy and age, the approach for the bulk of the interview was to frame
participants’ migration experiences chronologically. This meant beginning by asking
them about their decision to leave their home country and the process by which they
came to South Africa. Questions gradually traced forwards in time making a note of
changing locations, social connections and employment before arriving at the present
day. Once the interview had reached the present time, I would then proceed to questions
of current residence and employment. This chronological approach proved helpful and
effective, as it allowed participants to become storytellers who could shape the narrative
of their experiences as migrants and refugees, rather than simply ‘interview subjects’.
This tended to produce a more coherent narrative that contextualized participants’
present livelihood strategies within a wider history of migration. By the end of the
interview, when a rapport had been established, more personal and abstract questions
could be asked and addressed with more candour, such as their impressions of South
Africa, their struggles in the country and their hopes for the future.

While most interviews were conducted in English without an interpreter, there were
several occasions when migrants who wished to speak to me arranged their own
interpretation. For those participants who expressed an interest, I was able to return to
conduct interviews over several days, or drop by for a quick visit. This in turn produced
a different kind of data from the once-off interviews, as a deeper relationship was built
up, leading individuals to share detailed, useful knowledge, unique to research
relationships built upon trust (Agadjanian and Zotova, 2012). These strong relationships
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paid off, not only in helping with my snowball sampling, but also in leading me to
unexpected avenues of data collection.

2.3.3

Visiting Ethnic Community Associations

The final data collection method employed was unplanned. After almost three months
of collecting research through key informant and participant interviews, my research
took a new turn, prompting me to include data that I recorded while attending and
participating in ethnic community group meetings as an additional source of data. Over
the course of my interviews and informal visits, I built a friendship with a Congolese
family who lived in the neighbourhood where I was staying. Unbeknownst to me, the
father, Bondeko was considered an elder amongst Congolese from eastern DRC, having
employed and financially supported many Congolese newcomers in the ten years since
he had come to Cape Town. I had befriended a ‘gatekeeper’ participant with a wide
social network. Whether as a thank you for my (trying to) help with paperwork, or out
of pure generosity, Bondeko arranged for and escorted me to meetings with five
different (predominantly Congolese) ethnic organizations over the course of two weeks
across Cape Town.

Conversations were unstructured and guided by community leaders. Aside from taking
notes and audio recordings, my participation was confined to asking clarifying
questions, and suggesting new conversational directions. Many of the individuals in
these meetings I spoke with were highly connected with members of their own
community, and were able to share their feelings about what should be the priority for
refugee rights advocates. As many of the community leaders had lived in the city for
longer periods than most of my individual participants, they had a different perspective
to share, and were better informed about livelihood opportunities for forced migrants.
The results of these conversations form a substantial part of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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2.4 Research Challenges in the Field

As many participants were employed on casual or short-term work contracts, one of the
most common problems was securing an interview time and location. As participants
could be called in for work at any time, many interviews were arranged at the last
minute, often on Saturdays and Sundays to better fit the work schedules of participants.
These days were so popular that it sometimes necessitated multiple interviews in the
same day, which was an extra strain on scheduling and conducting interviews.

Another challenge was differing expectations between participants and myself. As
forced migrants in Cape Town receive little financial support from public institutions,
and no support from the South African government, building strategic relationships –
either with other migrants, South Africans or researchers – is part of basic livelihood
strategy. In such circumstances, there is a chance that researchers can raise unrealistic
expectations of help (Clark-Kazak, 2009). I did my best to mitigate these expectations
by explaining my position as a student and that I was there to learn and record migrants’
experiences. Due to the intimate nature and subject of the interviews, there were several
occasions where current serious personal issues were brought to my attention. Given my
outsider status in the city, without power, social networks, or organizational affiliation,
my primary means of providing support in these situations was to listen and affirm the
struggles that I was told about. In some cases, I was able to suggest that the participant
access financial or job-training support through Cape Town based organizations. In two
cases in particular, I facilitated access to mental health services and English classes.
While I would never condone research that was extractive, participants involved in the
study did not gain any direct benefit from participating, whereas I gained data used to
complete my Master’s degree.
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2.5 Confidentiality and Privacy

The entire research design, from the initial stages, was planned to minimize risk and
inconvenience to participants. At the start of each interview, a brief introduction to the
project and its objectives was made, emphasizing the voluntary and confidential nature
of the interview before it formally began. Oral and written explanations of the research
and its objectives were provided to participants, but in order to maintain confidentiality,
no names or signatures were recorded. While Cape Town is considered a relatively safe
city in South Africa, this security is contingent upon who you are, where you are, and
even what time of the day it is. For this reason, a variety of strategies were used in order
to mitigate any likelihood that speaking with a researcher would mark interviewers as
outsiders beyond what their typical street presence in the city would have done. When
arranging and conducting interviews, all reasonable steps were taken to ensure that
participants were not inconvenienced and endangered. While participants were not
financially compensated for their time, funds were provided to cover transport to and
from the interview site. When arranging interview times, an elaborate system of ‘missed
calls’ was used so that I could absorb the majority of airtime costs. When, as in most
cases, participants chose to meet in coffee shops or restaurants, I covered the cost of the
refreshments, normally coffee or tea. Pseudonyms are used in this thesis. All interviews
and the resulting transcriptions have been encrypted and kept in a secure electronic
location only accessible by me.

2.6 Data Analysis and Interpretation
Audio recordings or detailed handwritten notes were made while conducting interviews
with participants, key informants and in group meetings. There were several occasions
when participants did not wish to be recorded, and in these situations, I took shorthand
notes, which were then transcribed into structured field notes at the end of each day.
During more informal interactions, notes were later written from memory. All audio
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recordings were transcribed, and these, along with field notes, were uploaded into
NVIVO. These were then coded into basic themes such as ‘housing’, ‘finding work’ and
‘xenophobia’. As organizing the data continued, I created more analytical nodes to
reflect the deeper connections as they became apparent, such as ‘weak ties’, ‘strategic
essentialism’ and ‘racial scripts’. I also tried to code and analyze transcripts with the
eyes of a critical feminist geographer. Whenever possible, I have highlighted how men
and women’s livelihoods are constructed differently. At times, this has been difficult. In
the course of interviews, it was hard to introduce and maintain discussions about
perceived gender roles and differences in households. While I sometimes observed
gender dynamics that I viewed as problematic, this was often before or after an
interview. Without direct participant quotes to cite, I sometimes found it difficult to
include in my analysis in any substantial way.

In the findings chapters of this thesis,

when possible, I use quotations from these transcriptions in order to support my
analysis. Because interviews were conducted in participants’ second (or third, fourth or
fifth) languages, some conversations were circuitous and it was difficult to extract tidy
quotations. In these cases, I have summarized their words to the best of my ability,
drawing on interview notes and transcripts.

Converting the raw information into a cohesive thesis has been an emotional process.
Many difficult memories that were shared, such as rape and violent robberies, were only
peripheral to the central focus of the project: namely, the livelihoods of refugees. While
there is a substantial literature detailing and discussing such issues experienced by other
forced migrants, I still regret the fact that these experiences could not be better
represented in this thesis.

2.7 Conclusion
My research yielded rich data that provides in-depth insight into the experiences and
networks of forced migrants living in Cape Town. Although based on a small sample,
and thus not strictly generalizable, their individual experiences are suggestive of
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broader factors shaping the lives and livelihoods of forced migrants in South African
cities. Methodologically, this section has demonstrated that investing in relationships
with participants, and exploring their networks, can expand data collection in ways that
were unanticipated at the outset. As presented in the three chapters that follow,
participants’ diverse views and circumstances make the case that livelihood strategies
are heterogeneous, yet bounded by institutional structures, social barriers and lived
poverty. The following section, Chapter 3, will contextualise forced migrants’
experiences within the institutional structure of South Africa, drawing on data from
migrant and key informant interviews, to demonstrate the ways in which these
structures influence how forced migrant secure their livelihoods.

30

Chapter Three: ‘State’ Structures

3. 1 Introduction

Issues of citizenship and belonging in South Africa are right at the surface of everyday
politics and practice, ready to be read by anyone willing to pay attention. Perhaps one of
the clearest examples of the country’s true attitude towards foreigners is in South
Africa’s migration bureaucracy, which, through a combination of exclusionary and
prohibitive practices explored below, has shunted forced migrants into the narrowest
band of livelihood options available. In order to understand the interplay between legal
status, formal banking and participants’ livelihood options, this section explores how
refugees and asylum seekers in particular are excluded from the mainstream South
African economy by the practices of the Department of Home Affairs and their
intersection with national banking and financial services. This chapter addresses each
of these structures in turn, arriving at the conclusion that being outside of what Landau
(2008) refers to as the ‘ethos of control’ in the South African system is a major source
of difficulty and stress for participants, and thus pushes forced migrants into
marginalized employment, either for low pay or in the precarious informal economy.

3.2 Understanding the Structures of Legal Status: Obtaining Legal Asylum in
South Africa

This particular chapter, by necessity, focuses almost exclusively on the experiences of
participants in the study who were refugees or asylum seekers. Of the 32 participants in
this study, six were no longer part of the asylum system, having either naturalized (1),
attained a work permit (1) or acquired a Zimbabwean Dispensation Permit. Under these
migration classifications, it is much easier to maintain documentation and open bank
accounts, and so these participants’ experiences are considered in greater detail in
Chapters 4 and 5. This section 1) sets out the refugee application process in South
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Africa; 2) outlines legal challenges to current practice; and 3) identifies problem-points
in the process for refugees, linking each of these factors to forced migrants’ livelihood
practices.
Under the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, when prospective asylees first enter the country,
they make their initial claim at border offices such as Musina. They are then issued a
Section 23 transit permit in order to go to the closest Refugee Reception Office (RRO)
to have an admissibility interview. At this point, they are found either ‘manifestly
unfounded’, or become asylum seekers, and are issued section 22 permits. After
undergoing a second decision-making process, their claims are either rejected (after
appeal) or accepted, and they are given Section 24 permits, which recognize them as
official refugees under the protection of the South African state. This process can take
many years to complete from beginning to end. Unless refugees are able to become
permanent residents or attain refugee identification books, they must use these permits
as their primary form of identification. Permits themselves are physically insubstantial only a single piece of paper, which visually carry little authority, and can be easily lost
or worn down. Sometimes they are destroyed by police interested in extorting bribes
from ‘undocumented’ foreigners (Landau 2006), increasing refugees’ precarity.
Obtaining this legal status, and maintaining the corresponding identity permits, is
central to refugees and asylum seekers being able to live, work and study in South
Africa. While the process of obtaining legal asylum is meant to be simple, asylum
seekers in South Africa experience extreme difficulties during the application process
(Handmaker et al, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2008). This process is managed by the
“notoriously inefficient and corrupt” Department of Home Affairs (Hoag, 2011: 82),
which is responsible for providing civic services to South African citizens and
determining and administering the rights of all non-nationals to enter and remain in the
country, including refugees (DHA, 2014). Current immigration legislation prevents
lower-skilled African migrants from easily obtaining legal permission to stay in South
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Africa, and so many use the heavily back-logged asylum system as a way of
regularizing their stay (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2014).

The process of applying for asylum is a complicated one, including many steps and
hurdles along the way. The remaining part of this section is divided into three categories
identifying and describing the main challenges participants face when applying for
special protection in South Africa, linking each set of obstacles to participants’ struggles
to secure their livelihood. They are: 1) backlogs; 2) lines and treatment; and 3) renewal
of permits.
3.2.1 Backlogs
While DHA policy maintains that individuals with Section 22 Asylum-Seeker permits
are to receive their status determination within thirty days after submitting their claim
for asylum, massive backlogs of almost a quarter of a million undetermined asylum
applications render this impossible (UNHCR, 2015; Landau in Handmaker et al, 2008).
This backlog means that applications for asylum rarely get processed in a timely
manner, leaving many refugees ‘stuck’ with a Section 22 permit for extensive periods of
time, often for years. This requires frequent renewals and limits the rights that are
afforded to the applicant (Belvedere, 2007; de la Hunt and Kerfoot 2008; Handmaker et
al., 2008; Vigneswaran 2008).
The bureaucratic lag continues after an asylum seeker is officially recognized as a
Section 24 refugee, slowing access to other forms of legal documentation, like
permanent residence and refugee identification books that carry more legitimacy in the
South African economy. While technically refugees are able to apply for permanent
residence, “the obstacles effectively serve as a prohibition for doing so” (Landau in
Handmaker et al, 2008: 27). These backlogs render forced migrants unable to access
more credible documentation or permanent residence – that would reflect their extended
stays in South Africa, and make them more credible in the eyes of South African
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employers. Further, while refugees are entitled to refugee ID books, the backlog on this
processing has been so severe, that they are extremely uncommon. I did not meet a
single refugee possessing one in my four months of fieldwork. This is problematic, as
beyond their Section 22 or 24 permit, many forced migrants do not have official identity
documentation, such as a passport, and so lack credibility within South Africa and are
also unable to travel legally in the region.
3.2.2 Lines and Treatment
South African citizens, and those migrants with study, visitors or work permits, file
their paperwork at the Department of Home Affairs office, conveniently located in Cape
Town’s downtown core. While the building is crowded and the process is slow, dealing
with paperwork as a non-forced migrant is fairly straightforward. By contrast, the Cape
Town Refugee Reception Office is located on the edge of downtown, in a nondescript
building in very bad repair. The first thing that is immediately obvious is the long lines
of people waiting to be let into the building. Tourists and immigrants at the downtown
Home Affairs office are able to take a number and sit in a waiting area to wait for their
time to speak with an official. By contrast, refugees and asylum seekers must queue
outside the RRO, and are only let into the building in groups of ten or fewer. These lines
are a defining feature of the process: in order to claim asylum, the first step is getting
into the building. Lines to access RROs are often extremely long, with hundreds waiting
to be seen – only an estimated 30 percent of those in the line are able to speak with an
official on their first visit (Amit, 2012). Those who are not seen by a refugee reception
officer must either return later, risking being stopped without documentation by the
police, or sleep overnight outside of the RRO (Vigneswaran, 2008).
This was often spoken of as one of the most challenging parts of life in South Africa, as
those waiting in line often have to contend with poor weather conditions, the threat of
theft or rape, and extortion by police or security officers monitoring the lines
(Vigneswaran, 2008). For young, single men like Yves, queuing in this weather is
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degrading:
In winter and its raining, you're standing outside [and] fighting in the queue...
last time I was there for 4 in the morning until 4 p.m. - I didn't get help. And it
was raining. And I was like, what I am doing here?
For other participants, particularly those with children, the experience was more
traumatic. I met Mosi, a casual labourer and single father of 3 daughters (aged 6,
7 and 9) in June, when he was barely earning enough to feed his children. When
I ran into him a few weeks later, he was in even more emotional turmoil than
when we first met. While there were several major issues going on in his life, in
our conversation he kept returning to how, on a recent particularly chilly day
pouring with rain, RRO officials would not allow his daughters to stand under
the building’s overhang while he queued to have their permits renewed, forcing
them to stand for hours in the cold rain with him. He was outraged that the
officials would allow children to suffer like that, and compared refugee and
asylum seekers’ treatment by officials to that of animals.
By reason of sheer numbers, experiences like Yves’ and Mosi’s are the rule, rather than
the exception. In one study undertaken in Johannesburg, it was common for respondents
to return multiple times in order to have a single issue resolved, with an average of three
visits being required (Amit, 2012). One of my research participants, Ecclesiaste, an
asylum seeker also from DRC, reflects on the number of people waiting outside of the
RRO in Johannesburg, in his two-month attempt to lodge a claim;
Why wasn't it working? Because there's a lot of people, you have to be in the
line, you have to sleep there... you'll find people that sleep there for three
weeks, and I did try once in Pretoria, but it was hard to get it there also. There
were thousands of people.
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Despite Mosi and Yves’ experiences, Cape Town’s RRO is in fact considered better
than Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the comparative ease of filing paperwork may be a
factor that draws some forced migrants to settle in Cape Town. Ecclesiaste remembers;

I had friends, they told me, in Cape Town you can get papers easily... and I can
get easy job…in Cape Town, the first day I come here, the next day I went
Home Affairs and I did get my papers.

These issues, and particularly the long wait times, are attributed to a combination of
corruption and lack of capacity of the various RROs (ibid). It is obvious that it is not
only the amount of time it takes to begin a claim or to renew a permit that is the issue.
Participants made clear that they felt that their treatment at the RRO is degrading and
sometimes dehumanizing, and in some cases it was obviously a source of deep
emotional pain. This came to a head in the middle of my fieldwork, in a series of violent
confrontations between Home Affairs officials and migrants at RROs. In late May 2013,
security officials outside of the Cape Town office physically beat, pepper sprayed and
used stun grenades and a fire hose over three days to control a crowd of approximately a
thousand attempting to renew their permits (Amnesty International, 2013).

All participants’ voices shared in this chapter have been male. This is because there was
a gendered dimension to these protests, and to the DHA experience overall. A survey
administered by ACMS researchers, across four RROs (Cape Town, Musina, and two in
Pretoria), found that 70% of those using RROs are men, while only 30% are women.
Outside of the RRO in Cape Town, refugees are divided into two lines according to
gender10. This gender division was noted by male participants. As Ecclesiaste recounts:

10

While I never found an official reason for this divide, it was suggested that this may
be because the men were seen as too violent, and were pushing in front of women in the
line.
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Imagine, I come from Swellendam11, just to come to Home Affairs. It's raining
[hard] like this, you are in the line, and then they just get women inside, they get
the paper, but you men, you must go. The time is finished, you stay there in the
morning, you stay there from 6 o’clock [a.m.] to 5 [p.m.], there is nothing. I
really don't know how many woman they take, But woman, they can come any
time, they get papers, but men, they have to stay in the line.

Despite the fact that the men’s line is always much longer, in the week leading up to
May’s events only women and children had been allowed inside the center, causing
increasing anger and anxiety amongst male asylum seekers and refugees, many of
whom had had their permits expire while waiting (Amnesty International, 2013). While
this thesis demonstrates that female participants face a series of hurdles that few male
participants do, such as lesser ability to borrow money or maintain wide social
networks, in legal paperwork they seem to have a slight advantage. While women also
waited in lines for hours, and are undoubtedly also mistreated by an unjust system, they
did not share stories of the same magnitude. While the ACMS study is thorough in its
investigation of migrant experiences of RROs, their data is not gender disaggregated. In
light of my findings and the cause of the May 2013 events, I suggest that more research
into the gendered experiences of the asylum system in South Africa may produce
interesting results.

3.2.3 Renewing Permits and Employment
For those who already have documentation, renewing documents is also a lengthy
undertaking. While the DHA specifies that Section 24 permits be renewed every two
years, and Section 22 each year, agents working at the RROs continue to specify one to
three month renewal periods for the Section 22 permits, regardless of a lack of
legislation prescribing the validity period for the permits. Such short renewal intervals
11

Approximately two and a half hours away by bus.
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require those holding such permits to leave work frequently, often for several days at a
time. This is particularly cumbersome for refugees living outside of Cape Town whose
claim is lodged at the Cape Town RRO. Refugees told me about their high transport and
lodging costs, and reported acquaintances who had travelled from as far off as Port
Elizabeth in order to renew their paperwork. Amongst my participants, at one time,
Somali spaza shop owner Mahmoud had to travel all the way from George every three
months in order to renew his permits.
Like many, Ecclesiaste’s troubles from constant renewals spilled over into his
employment. He received a spate of short permit renewals: “they give me just three
months, two months, last past month, they give me two days, four days, one week, one
month. And then after that one month.” He knew that his frequent absences at work
made him seem less dependable and more demanding to his employer: ‘every month
you have to tell them 'I'm going to Home Affairs, I'm going to Home Affairs' and they're
telling you ‘no’’. Currently waiting for an appeal of his negative asylum decision,
Ecclesiaste has spent parts of his time in Cape Town undocumented. He explained that
when his boss called him into work on the days he had off, under threat of losing his
job, he opted to work, rather than wait to get his papers renewed:
For extension, you don't get your paper, they tell you have to go home. Then
you're working, sometimes they [RRO] call you, but you have to go to work. But
if you stay for a week [at the RRO], you don't go to work, you don't eat. You
have to pay rent, and rent here in Cape Town is so expensive. If you don't work,
they [landlords] chase you out.
Fearful of losing his employment, Ecclesiaste chose to let his paperwork expire. Not
only could he be jailed or deported if discovered, but it is also an expensive problem to
fix:
If your paper expired more than a week, you have to pay a fine. I did stay two
years with my paper [expired]. [I was] looking for that two thousand five

38

hundred [Rand12] to be able to pay. I did, last year, I paid that money. I fixed my
paper. Because I can't work without the paper.
Amongst others, the above accounts of both Mahmoud and Ecclesiaste overwhelmingly
link the access to legal paperwork with participants’ livelihoods. For self-employed
small business owners like Mahmoud, the time spent in line represents lost revenue
because he is not there to open his shop. For those seeking to work for an employer, or
in the casual labour industry, waiting in line impedes their efforts to find jobs, and
endangers employment they have managed to secure, making them less desirable as
they appear to be less dependable and available to work. As demonstrated by
Ecclesiaste, such frequent renewals and the long wait to receive them may force some
employed migrants to choose between renewing their papers or keeping their jobs. The
legal precariousness caused by such frequent and time consuming renewals detracts
from the little currency that Section 22 and 24 permits hold with South African
employers. What is more, it impinges upon refugees’ abilities to find formal
employment, by engaging permit holders in a constant cycle of queuing and waiting, in
order to maintain their legal right to reside in South Africa. As the following section on
access to formal banking notes, these issues bleed into other aspects of refugees’ lives,
and infringe upon their ability to participate fully in the formal South African economy.
3.3 Access to Formal Banking
Since 2010, with a change in banking legislation, bank accounts can be opened in South
Africa without the green bar coded identity document held by South African citizens
and permanent residents (FICA, 2010). For refugees and asylum seekers, this FICA
amendment, which appears progressive and useful on paper, has been stymied by the
continuing requirement of a valid Section 22 or 24 permit to open a bank account. By
binding access to formal banking so closely with migrants’ legal status, the problems
12

At the time of fieldwork, the conversion rate between the Canadian dollar and South
African Rand was 10 ZAR to 1 CAD.
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that migrants experience at RRO offices in obtaining and renewing their permits trickle
down into their access to banking, making opening a bank account difficult, time
consuming, and in some cases, virtually impossible. This section describes how this
process works and what makes it particularly difficult, and then explores the main
livelihood implications of this issue.

3.3.1 Opening an Account
In South Africa’s official regulatory process, if refugees and asylum seekers wish to
open an account, Section 22 and Section 24 permit holders must come to a bank with
their official permits and proof of residence. Before the bank account can be opened,
applicants must obtain a form from the bank, which they must then take to the
Department of Home Affairs for the purposes of verifying that the applicant is
legitimate. The form is then left at the DHA, and eventually mailed or faxed back to the
bank branch where the applicant has begun to open their account. While the DHA
claims that this process takes around two days, this is impeded by the same challenges
at RROs listed above, and in reality often takes several months before the banks receive
verification from the DHA13. For this reason, only those who are extremely determined
to open an account are able to do so. Amongst my group of participants, those with ZDP
papers, and two Congolese men were the only people with accounts.

The bank account, once approved, is linked to the expiration date on the permit, and it,
along with any assets in the account, is frozen one month before the next expiry date of
the individual’s permit. This process, onerous in itself, is compounded by the short
renewal periods that Section 22 permit holders receive, making it nearly impossible for
asylum seekers with short renewal periods to maintain a bank account (Hoeflich, 2014).
Once an account has been closed or frozen, a time consuming, Kafka-esque process is
necessary in order to open it again. Ecclesiaste’s story demonstrates the process:
13

This process was explained to me by participants, and by key informants at both
UCT’s Refugee Rights Unit and ARESTA.
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E: I did have a bank account, but, they did close it because my paper expired for
two years. I did have money inside, but the bank closed it. At Home Affairs I go
to pay 2500 rand, I did have a bank account, FNB, I put money inside my bank
account. I did use a card. By then, my paper was already expired. I go to the
bank, they tell me I have to fix my paper, I have to pay again 2500, pay in Home
Affairs. After two years, the time I go to pay that money, I go there with my
bank, they don't recognize, the bank account is already expired.

MN: How much money was in there?

E: 2,300 [rand].They tell me that money did finish with monthly fees and bank
fees. And then the bank closed it. I wanted to open another account. They said
they can't. So now? I don't have a bank account.

The most common response to these challenges is through evasion. The majority of
participants, those who worked in the cash and informal economies hawking and
trading, artisans and hair stylists, did not need an account, and therefore avoided it. But
some participants, particularly those involved in casual or temporary employment,
including those at Fundi, needed access to the formal banking system. In response to
this need, participants used a series of tactics and strategies in order to perform
necessary banking activities, which are further detailed in Chapter 5.

3.3.2 Implications of Lack of Access to Banking
Lack of access to banking has non-monetary costs as well as livelihood implications.
Work on forced migrants’ access to financial services has not been substantially
updated since 2005 (cf. Jacobsen 2005, Jacobsen & Bailey, 2004), and focuses on the
link between exclusion from banking and opportunistic crime. Criminals know that
foreigners have irregular access to banking and so choose them as targets, knowing they
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are more likely to be carrying cash (Jacobsen & Bailey, 2004). Criminals are not the
only ones who take advantage - law enforcers have also been known to target migrants
for arbitrary arrest based on the assumption that they might not have status in South
Africa. Police, also aware that non-nationals have difficulty opening bank accounts,
deliberately hassle migrants because they know they are more likely to get a bribe out of
a migrant (Landau, 2008).

There are other costs to being excluded from banking which can also insidiously affect
the stability of participants’ livelihoods’ in the long term. Lack of access to banking
impedes participants’ ability to be paid for their labour, build their credit scores and
access loans; it also prevents them from presenting themselves as fully included in the
local and global financial economy. These frustrations and lost business opportunities
represent an incalculable economic and social obstacle, and were explained to me most
clearly by a Congolese couple who had been living in the Western Cape for over a
decade. Together they opened and operated a well-located and profitable hair salon in
central Fish Hoek, where in addition to themselves, they employed two staff members.
Through a series of savvy business operations, they have been able to open a second
business, a convenience store next to the salon. Although they have been able to build
two profitable, brick and mortar shops, because of their refugee status, and ‘personal’14
bank accounts they are unable to get a home mortgage, which in turn, makes it
impossible to buy property.

Instead of buying a house, which would enable them to provide a home for their five
children while building their equity and renting out additional rooms for a profit, they
are forced to rent, struggling to find a landlord willing to rent to a large, non-South
African family. The couple compared continually paying rent on a month-to-month
basis to ‘pouring your money into the ground’.

14

Refugees and asylum seekers are not eligible to open business bank accounts.
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This connects to a wider point about how those in the informal economy manage their
assets – which is to say they keep it in material goods, rather than cash. To an outsider,
it may seem like small business operators, such as spaza shop owners and the couple
above, are wealthy because their businesses are well-stocked and well-run, but this is
often far from the truth. In reality, for many, these shops represent all of their savings,
or are even bought from loans. Ali Mohamed, a Somali spaza shop owner operating out
of Mitchell’s Plain, explains this misconception:

"AM: if they see Somalian, they think they've got money…[but] if you sell
sweet and …small groceries… you can get per month, … two thousand or three
thousand. Then, early in the morning, you wake up, you try and buy some stock.
The people, they see this money and they think that you've got a lot of money."

Now, consider the current socio-political climate in South Africa, and the fact that in
both 2008 and 2015, xenophobic attacks and looting were directed at foreigners and
foreign operated businesses, which completely destroyed targeted shops. While South
Africans or permanent residents are able to convert their wealth into real property,
forced migrants can either deposit it into a bank account, which they may have trouble
accessing at a later date, or invest it back into their business – which, given the
likelihood they will be targeted for robberies or, in extreme cases, looting, can create its
own risks. Considered alongside the prospect of a house, an asset with a steady value,
the asset range that forced migrants have in which to invest their capital is confined and
precarious.

3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the system of regulations that determines forced
migrants’ access to both legal status and formal banking opportunities. The Department
of Home Affairs’ extensive backlog of applications, long line-ups and too-frequent
renewal periods negatively affect participants’ abilities to obtain and retain
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employment. These difficulties in maintaining legal status trickle down, affecting
participants’ abilities to maintain sustained access to formal banking. Together, these
twin institutions preoccupy participants’ time, ensuring that they lose value as potential
employees and become more appetizing targets for opportunistic crime. This, paired
with a disinclination on the part of many employers to hire foreigners, ensures that
forced migrants are pushed to the margins of the South African economy, and
compelled to engage in low paid, precarious work or enter into the informal economy.
A description of the nature and types of this work, including the various sectors
participants from different countries of origin engage in, is the focus of Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Cape Town’s Informal Economy
Madeleine Northcote and Belinda Dodson15

4.1 Introduction
Refugees and asylum-seekers who come to South Africa from elsewhere on the African
continent engage in a number of different occupations and forms of employment in
order to earn a livelihood. Although some are in formal employment, many earn their
living in insecure, informal employment -- such as casual labour in construction or
domestic service -- or through entrepreneurial activities as traders, artisans or providers
of various personal services.

Refugees and registered asylum-seekers are legally

permitted to work in South Africa, but even with valid documents, formal employment
is difficult to secure given prevailing anti-immigrant attitudes and South African
employers’ suspicion of documents such as asylum-seekers’ permits, as discussed in
Chapter 3 (Handmaker et al. 2008; Landau & Wa Kabwe Segatti, 2009). Forced
migrants thus commonly resort to marginal informal economic activity such as street
trading, tailoring and the creation and the sale of curios and beadwork, often in coethnic networks. Forced migrants’ livelihoods commonly straddle, and indeed
challenge, the division between formality and informality. We find that many migrants
combine formal and informal employment, or use gains from one to attain entry into the
other. For some, working in the informal sector can be a stepping-stone to more formal
and secure employment, while for others it remains a survivalist trap from which they
are unable to escape. Through participants’ stories it is clear that factors such as social
support, past education, and above all gender, determine which sectors individuals
choose, and their success within them. A complex amalgam of factors structures the
15

A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in a forthcoming book
entitled Urban Informality and Migrant Entrepreneurship in South African Cities edited
by Jonathan Crush and Abel Chikanda.
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range of livelihood strategies available to migrants, and their choices must be
understood within the context of personal history, local and transnational social
connections, and the legal and political frameworks of South African society. A final,
section of this chapter discusses the effect that business robberies have on migrant
businesses, as well as on the physical and emotional well-being of the Somali traders
affected.

4.2 Migrants’ Livelihoods
Amongst the forced migrants interviewed for this study, four broad categories of
occupation were identified. First, there is employment as casual or day labour, notably
in construction and gardening for men and domestic work for women. Second, there are
various forms of trading and hawking, from roadside stalls and itinerant trading to more
fixed establishments known as spaza shops. Third, there are various forms of
artisanship in the manufacture of crafts such as beadwork, wire and metalwork,
woodcarvings and paintings. Fourth, there are personal services such as hair braiding
and barbering, often to clients who are themselves migrants. The sections below detail
each of these livelihood categories, drawing on the experiences of individual migrants
to highlight the strategies adopted and the opportunities and obstacles encountered.

4.2.1 Day Labourers and Casual Workers
Casual labour is used to refer to informal work that is performed for an employer but
without the rights associated with formal employment, such as sick leave, paid leave, or
a formal contract (Devey et al.,2006). The term ‘day labour’ is used to describe a jobseeking practice in which workers search for work on a day-to-day basis, in both the
formal and informal sectors (Blaauw & Krugell, 2014). These search strategies include
posting personal advertisements on public notice boards and private mailboxes, using
employment agencies, asking door-to-door and, most visibly, standing at roadside
labour recruitment sites. Casual and day labour are important sources of income for
many South African nationals as well as international migrants. A previous study in
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Cape Town showed that employers picking up labour at roadside sites tend to prefer
foreign nationals (Sharp, 2012). Similarly, a study in Pretoria found that Zimbabweans,
who on average had higher levels of human capital and English language skills, were
able to earn more on a day-to-day basis than their South African counterparts (Blaauw
et al., 2012).

Certainly, day labour still was or previously had been a major source of income for
many of the participants in this study. While some were able to move from casual and
day labour into more secure and formal employment, the ability to make this transition
was heavily mediated by an individual’s social position. Claude, a migrant from CongoBrazzaville, for example, first came to South Africa as a refugee more than twelve years
ago. Beginning by retrieving carts at a grocery store, he moved on to work as a carguard and eventually a security guard while going to college in Cape Town to get a
qualification in electrical engineering.

After graduating, he began working for an

electrical company and then eventually, through the Fundi Network, a labour
recruitment and training organization, built an independent electrical contracting
business. The turning point came when he was able to buy a truck:

Three years ago…I had small car - and that car was giving me a lot of problems.
And the guy said to me, ‘like this you can't make it. In order to make it, you
must get a truck. But to get a truck is not easy, so the money that you make, you
must keep it away, because you are living in my place, so don't pay rent, and that
money you can save, and then, until you can get the money that will allow you
to buy the truck.

The generosity of his friend, along with substantial remittances from family in
Brazzaville, thus allowed him to save up to buy a truck, a key step in the transition to
self-employment and even becoming an employer himself. At the time he was
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interviewed, he was making use of the casual labour system to hire employees for his
own business.

By contrast, Mosi, a single father of three from Goma, DRC, had failed to secure even a
subsistence income having arrived in South Africa in 2005.

At the time of the

interview, he was still earning less than the bare minimum to support his family. A key
means of survival was the generosity of fellow Congolese – one woman in particular
allowed him and his young daughters to live with her family and contribute what he
could to the rent whenever possible. He continued to have little success obtaining
formal employment based on his office work experience. Furthermore, the casual jobs
he did obtain as a painter, also through the Fundi Network, never translated into longerterm projects. Since painting is a job that utilises common skills, he competes with a
large pool of applicants for each job. Painting is a low-paying occupation – at R250 per
day compared to an electrician or carpenter’s R350 per day. Finally, as a refugee from
war-affected eastern Congo, Mosi had endured considerable trauma in his personal life,
having lost most of his immediate family in the DRC to a combination of war and
illness. The effects of this loss, paired with the added strain of caring for his young
daughters, caused him extreme mental anguish, which undoubtedly interfered with his
ability to find and secure work.

Raphael, a 28-year-old participant from Kinshasa, DRC, had come to South Africa just
a year previously in 2012, with only a basic understanding of English. He occasionally
received remittances from his sisters, who live in Europe, in the form of cologne,
electronics and cash. When he was first interviewed, he had steady employment through
the Fundi Network as a painter and general labourer, and attended free English classes
in the afternoons at a local refugee aid organization. In the following year, he went
through a series of jobs but in an upward trajectory. He began working in a private
security firm, which eventually led him to a hospitality-training programme. He was
able to do the programme because the owner of the house where he worked as a security
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guard gifted him a lump sum of R1500 for tuition, an amount he would have had
difficulty in obtaining otherwise. That programme resulted in him finding work as a
waiter in a high-end restaurant in Cape Town’s Southern Suburbs where he had been
fully employed for several months.

Joy, a twenty-year-old mother from eastern DRC was one of the most precarious
labourers interviewed in this study. A survivor of rape while still in the Congo, she
came to South Africa to join her sole remaining family member, and now supports her
two-year-old daughter out of the money she earns working two days a week as a
domestic worker in Woodstock and Paarl, each for R150 per day. She shares a room in
a rented apartment with eight other individuals and pays rent monthly. Unlike the
previous male respondent with three children, she did not receive much support from
community members in looking after her daughter.

This difference in community

support may be gender based – while single parenting as a father is seen as an
aberration, hers, despite resulting from an unwanted pregnancy, does not. A sentiment
expressed by many of the Congolese women interviewed was that ‘to be a woman, you
have to learn how to suffer.’ The lack of support had a direct effect on her employment
prospects. At the time of the interview, she had recently turned down a job in a
restaurant washing dishes because transportation and child-care costs would have
outweighed the additional income.

What these individual stories illustrate is the considerable heterogeneity of experience
amongst this group of ‘refugee’ labourers. While two were able to build and then
leverage their social and kinship networks financially, and successfully move from
insecure or undesirable work into more secure and higher earning jobs, the others have
so far been unable to move beyond casual, low-status employment, and seem trapped in
precarious labour. Those who arrived in South Africa without dependants, and were
well-educated, urban and middle-class could draw on family members for financial
support.

Each had also a ‘lucky break’ through a generous friend or employer
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providing a ‘rent holiday’ or financial assistance for skills development or business
investment. The others lacked the same social capital or connections that could provide
a launching point into formal employment. Further, there is a clear gender bias in how
success is attained.

In contrast to the casual jobs that the men were able to secure,

work as a domestic labourer was comparatively socially isolating for the woman
involved.

Male participants commonly worked as part of a team, such as on a

construction site, thereby allowing them to build their language skills and open up a
web of possible social and business connections. Domestic labour such as washing
dishes, doing laundry and cleaning homes do not offer these same possibilities.
Particular home country experiences are also an important consideration, as some had
experienced severe personal trauma related to the conflict in eastern DRC. Although the
stories above are all drawn from refugee narratives, casual labour is therefore used by
individuals to varying effect, based upon the other resources on which they are able to
draw. The evidence suggests that it can, in conjunction with social capital, individual
ambition and sheer good luck, act as a stepping stone to more secure, formal
employment.

4.2.2 Hawking and Trading: Street-Side Stalls to Spaza Shops

Perhaps the most visible livelihood strategy in which migrants engage is hawking and
various forms of street-side selling. This is undertaken either on foot or out of stalls that
line roadsides carrying heavy pedestrian traffic, such as near taxi and bus ranks.
Passers-by have access to a series of hawkers’ stands that sell an ever-changing
combination of sweets, cigarettes, and fruit and vegetables, as well as cosmetic and
hygiene products, clothing and shoes. Artisanal craft traders operate from various sites
including traffic intersections, tourist destinations, or in markets that have themselves
become tourist destinations such as Greenmarket Square, located in downtown Cape
Town. Another common migrant trading enterprise is the ‘spaza shop’, the small
convenience store found in informal and low-income residential areas of South African
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cities. These forms of retail activity are variously complementary, collaborative, or in
competition with those of South African nationals. This has sometimes made the
migrants targets of xenophobic violence (Crush et al., 2008; Charman & Piper, 2011,
2012; Gastrow, 2013). Other constraints include the pressure to remit money to family
members in their countries of origin and the extra time required to keep their refugee
papers and asylum-seekers’ permits up to date. As with the casual labour livelihoods
described above, factors such as family relations, gender roles and sheer good (or bad)
fortune also affect the success or otherwise of their businesses.

Outside a Shoprite supermarket in Mowbray – a neighbourhood near the University of
Cape Town – are a series of hawker and vegetable stands.

Angela and Priscilla, two

Zimbabwean women in their late twenties operate vegetable stalls, and were doing a
brisk trade during the early afternoon when they were interviewed. Their livelihoods
are based on low-margin trading: buying bunches of various greens for six rand and
selling them for seven, thus making a one rand profit on each transaction. Because the
margin is so slight, ensuring a high number of sales each day is crucial. As one
explained, ‘when you don't open, you lose money.’

The need for a high daily sales

volume is threatened by the bureaucratic requirement for refugees and asylum-seekers
to return regularly to the Department of Home Affairs where they initiated their claim in
order to renew their permits. The length of time between renewals depends on to the
individual case, and can range between one day, in extreme cases, to just once a year, as
determined at the discretion of the immigration officer. The majority of participants
renewed their papers every two to six months. This has a serious impact on income
earning, as each day spent queuing at Home Affairs means a day not spent working, and
thus not earning any income.

The two women also spoke about the long hours, high

expense and hard labour involved in acquiring their produce: a twice-weekly event
which involves travel by train, bus and by foot in order to transport the sizable bags of
greens back from the local markets in Ottery and Epping to Mowbray. Both women had
found their vendor locations through word-of-mouth networking, and rental of the space
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was managed through verbal agreement with the ‘owner’ of the space, who rents the
space from the city in his name. They stored their produce nearby which, along with
rental of the space, cost them R550 every month – a considerable amount, given that
each woman estimated she only made R2,000 after expenses each month.

Asked where they would like to be in five years, both women said they hoped to be
doing something other than selling vegetables – although it provided an income, it was
not a ‘good job.’ For many migrants, running a marginal stall or a shop is still
preferable to being an employee. Angela had left her previous job working at a
guesthouse in order to deliver and look after her second child and was optimistic about
her new trade as a vegetable seller:

Here is better… it’s better to get my three hundred or two hundred a day… than
to get three-fifty a week… they don’t want to increase the money –that’s why
this is better for me.

The freedom of self-employment is compromised by the inherent uncertainty of running
a business. While earning two or three hundred rand a day may seem to be a healthy
income, day-to-day income fluctuates widely. Most participants highlighted that at the
beginning of the month, when paycheques are received, sales are high and business is
good, but by the end of the month, when earnings have been spent, sales taper
downward until the next month’s pay period.

The need to work, in order to survive in South Africa but also to remit money home, is
an intense pressure that trumps everything else. An illustrative example is Fowsiyo, a 26
year old Somali woman, who sent her young son back to Somalia so that she could open
up a shop and start remitting money to relatives:
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[My husband] told me, you can't work if you have a small kid – you can't work
outside [but] he doesn't have enough money to give me – he's paying rent, and
then he's paying pampers, milk, food. Whatever he had he gave me, but I don't
have money to send to my family, and so the family suffered in Somalia. I sent
[my baby] to Somalia. My baby is now staying in Somalia. My mom took the
baby and then I can work hard. I'm a strong woman, I get everywhere to buy
stuff, I have money to survive, and then I will rent house. But now I am living
in only room, by myself.

The pressure to support her family in Somalia, including her mother and eight younger
siblings, was sufficient for her to ignore cultural expectations that a young mother
should stay home and care for her children and instead open up a shop. Her decision
came at a price. Not only was her young child back to Somalia, but her marriage
eventually ended over continued disagreements between her and her husband over her
decision to work. Her situation not only demonstrates the strongly gendered ideas about
work and social roles in many migrant communities, it shows the significance that
migrants attach to earning sufficient income to remit money back home.

This is

something for which they are prepared to endure considerable personal sacrifice and
self-exploitation.

Her hard work and entrepreneurship were evident as she described how she had built up
her business from a R3,000 investment given to her by her husband by buying and
reselling items in the Bellville business district, gradually expanding the scale and scope
of her trading:

I asked him for R3,000 and I bought socks, sunglasses, and earrings, and then I
put them in big plastic [carton] outside in the taxi rank, in Bellville. People
come and say ‘Hey, how are you’ and picked earrings and sunglasses. With the
small money I got, I made this stand. And then when I made a stand, I bought
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two tables, and put them this side. And then I worked and got enough money - I
put in clothes, I put this side jackets, this side clothes. It is now three years
[since I started the business].

In economic terms alone, she might be considered a refugee success story. Another
successful entrepreneur was Joyce, a Congolese woman who makes her living operating
a small grocery stall in Cape Town’s main bus terminal, where she had been selling for
over ten years.

Unlike the others, who sell local produce, Joyce sells imported food

products from the DRC. Though her trade is based on selling foreign goods, she
acquires her stock through an in-country process whereby money changes hands (via
intermediaries) several times in South Africa before the products reach her shop. This is
noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, a variety of individuals are employed in South
Africa in transporting the goods; and secondly, she is not overtly competing with South
African counterparts, as they are unlikely to sell Congolese products.

One major form of competition between foreign traders and their South African
counterparts is for physical space in trading sites, whether formally or informally
managed and controlled (Hunter & Skinner, 2003). This scramble for space emerged
again and again in the interviews with hawkers and traders. One extreme example
concerns a young Somali woman named Fadumo, who was working as an itinerant
clothes seller. Because she could not secure a permanent place to sell her goods, she
was travelling between Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg and walking door
to door in Somali neighbourhoods in order to sell clothing, finding places to stay as she
went. This competition did not sit well with all participants. Joyce noted with some
resentment that South Africans get preferential access to the City's trading sites in Cape
Town's bus terminal. The difficulty of accessing retail space not only happens in the
central business district, but also in neighbourhoods outside of the city core. One spaza
shop operator in Mitchell’s Plain, Ali Mohamed, described how his rent continued to
rise as his landlord threatened to find a new tenant who was willing to pay more.
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Most of the individuals engaged in street and spaza shop trading can be classified as
survivalists rather than successful entrepreneurs. Their businesses have low market
entry costs, but also low profit margins, and very little possibility for significant growth
or advancement. Family networks can be both an asset and a liability, supplying startup capital but also pressuring them to remit money which they might otherwise save or
reinvest in their business. Although some respondents had managed to establish
themselves with a degree of long-term security, the livelihoods of many remained
highly precarious despite their hard work and considerable personal sacrifice, often at
the cost of a stable family life and their own personal safety.

4.2.3 Artisans, Wireworkers and Artists

The artisan industry, which caters primarily to tourists visiting Cape Town, is an
important form of self-employment amongst migrants (Visser & Rogerson, 2004).
Amongst the items associated with this form of business are wire-beaded and
metalwork sculptures, animal carvings and wooden utensils, and various kinds of art,
including paintings as well as potato-print and tie-dye cloth, which are made and sold
for a profit.

This informal industry, which clusters geographically around tourist

attractions, includes a diversity of actors from a range of different countries. Certain
sectors are associated with particular nationalities. The local cost and availability of
materials, which can differ significantly between cities, also affects artisans’ choice of
media. In Johannesburg, Zimbabweans are known for their stone and wood sculptures,
which are carved from materials sourced in Zimbabwe. In interviews, Zimbabwean
artisans explained that due to the geographical distance, while working in Cape Town,
they choose to specialise in wire and beadwork, as the materials are easier to source,
and the margins are greater.
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The artisanal craft trade is complex, with a series of internal rules and conventions. As
with street traders and hawkers, space is at a premium and competition fierce.
Newcomers have to fight and negotiate in order to gain a place on the street to sell their
goods, a process that can take several weeks or even months. Crafts-sellers range from
individuals, normally migrants, selling goods they have made themselves to established
South African business owners selling bought pieces in brick and mortar shops. Some
migrants act as intermediaries selling a variety of items, which may be locally sourced
from artisans within Cape Town or from other artisans across South Africa and other
parts of the continent. Several vendors interviewed for this study stated that they
travelled back and forth, buying goods such as items made of malachite or wooden
masks in their home countries (for example, Senegal and the DRC) and then importing
them to be re-sold at a profit in South Africa.

Two of the Zimbabwean migrant artisans in this study, Tanaka and Samuel, were
interviewed in Kalk Bay and Camps Bay, respectively. They had come to South Africa
with the specific intention of pursuing their art as a business in South Africa. Both had
studied various art techniques in Zimbabwe and acquired these skills while still in high
school. While these skills have translated into a steady revenue stream in Cape Town,
both men had previously worked in other industries, and in other countries (Namibia,
Botswana and Swaziland) before coming to South Africa. This had given them a chance
to further improve their skills through practice and instruction from peers with more
refined techniques. Both men showed considerable business acumen and skill – for
instance, by making contact with organizations for commissioned works, and constantly
searching for new venues and outlets through which to display and sell their craft. Both
participants employed web searches and word-of-mouth networks in order to secure
tables at weekly markets or larger events. One noted that although the cost to rent a
table at the National Arts Festival was expensive – over R4,000 for ten days in addition
to transport and other expenses – when shared between four friends, it was ‘worth it’
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because of the considerable profit to be made. Samuel described how his artistic
decisions are mediated by his business practice as follows:

I taught myself after school. [I do] paintings, bead and wire, metal…at the
moment, I like these townships [paintings], because they're cheap, cheap
material. I don't buy anything, only the paint, which is very cheap, compared to
the beads and wire, which is very expensive. Like this [painting], the production
cost is R5 or maybe even less but I can sell it for R80. I would have gone for
work in a restaurant or somewhere here in Cape Town, but art is better for me.

The wire working industry is heavily male-dominated, perhaps because as Matshaka
(2009; 73), found, amongst young men in the trade, wire working is ‘an esteemed trade,
a masculine domain.’

Asked why the artisan trade was almost exclusively male,

Samuel observed:

The only thing is with the craft you have to be strong. You have to be patient you sit at home, like a week, you produce, then maybe on the weekends you
come out, you come to Camps Bay, and you don't sell anything. I've seen a lot of
people trying to do crafts – they tried, at first they were patient, but later on,
they're like, ‘ah no.’ And they're doing something else now. To be a crafter?
You need to be patient and work hard. Like for me … I paint until two am, then
I sleep maybe four hours or so, and then I get up and dry things and then I come
here.

In her fieldwork on Cape Town’s wire workers, Matshaka (2009) notes that she
encountered only two women engaged in the sale of these crafts, but does not offer an
explanation for this. The implication of the above quote – that women do not sell crafts
because they lack patience and a good work ethic is disproved even within this chapter
by the many successful female entrepreneurs interviewed. Rather, the imbalance of
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female artisans and sellers probably has more to do with factors like the willingness to
repeatedly approach tourists, in English, to make a sale; access to mentors willing to
train women in the craft; and their ability to contend successfully – both verbally and
sometimes physically – with other artisans for a space to sell their wares. For the men
involved, working selling wire crafts was not only a means of securing an income, but
also a path to self-employment. One participant expressed this as the freedom of selfdetermination – to decide what to sell, and when, and to not have to be beholden to a
boss.

The artisanal sector spans survivalist, entry-level participants right through to successful
craft entrepreneurs. In general, this sector appears to accord higher status and generate
greater earnings relative to other forms of trading, despite having similarly low entry
costs. Although the basic form of the artisans’ livelihood is similar to that of street
traders and hawkers, their income is based less on numerous low-margin transactions,
but more on a smaller number of more lucrative transactions, primarily with tourists.
There seemed to be a wide range of income levels, but most of the artisans indicated
that they were working in the sector because the income was steady enough to make it
worthwhile. It was also preferred to casual labour or even formal employment in the
service sector.

4.2.4 Hair Salons and Hair Braiding

Despite the widespread presence of migrant-operated hair salons in Cape Town, as well
as other parts of South Africa, there is very little research literature on this particular
kind of migrant entrepreneurship. An investigation into the types of foreign workers in
Durban did find that 32 per cent were involved in ‘hair cutting’ as a primary activity
(Hunter & Skinner, 2003). In areas such as Mowbray and Claremont in Cape Town,
there are several brick and mortar hairdresser and barbershops clustered together in
order to draw students from the University of Cape Town, as well as passing shoppers.
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In the main minibus stations, women advertise their hairdressing services with placards
displaying the various styles available to passing commuters. Two aspects of this
industry make it particularly interesting: first, it offers a low-cost entry-level job for
self-employed women; and second, it has a reputation for being a business with a high
proportion of non-South Africans.

Many women from the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville are to be found working and
running hair-braiding salons across the city of Cape Town. One hair salon owner, Grace
said that when she first arrived in 2002 from Kinshasa, few South African women were
braiding their hair at all. As more Congolese women migrated to South Africa and
opened shops, South African women started having their hair braided in salons. In
Cape Town, the hair-braiding salons represent a significant industry and source of
income for migrant women. All the braiders interviewed for this study had nonprofessional experience braiding hair before coming to South Africa, and for this
reason, considered it a relevant job for them to undertake. With flexible hours of work,
and the possibility of bringing their children to work with them, working as a hairbraider accommodates women’s childcare duties better than other kinds of work.

There is also a clear progression in the sector. Hair-braiders typically begin working as
apprentices, making an incremental amount of money to help the salon owner or other
braiders complete a job. Despite the small amounts, this money still plays a vital role in
some families. One Congolese braider, Saleh, whose husband, Bondeko, had postponed
cataract surgery until he became blind, was supporting her family of two adults and five
children on their dwindling savings and the money she was making as a hair-braiding
apprentice. Although her older children mocked the meagre earnings of around R200
per week, she pointed out to me that it was worthwhile, as she was able to cover part of
the weekly grocery budget with her earnings.

59

After a certain amount of time, as apprentices progress, they start bringing in their own
clients and pay commission to the salon owner. One salon owner, Janette from
Brazzaville, Congo, tells her own story;

J: For the beginning, I was working outside, for the town, to the stand. After
that, I meet my husband here, and then my man, he was the one looked for me
the place here because he say no, I can't working outside, because you see now,
its winter, it’s not easy… I was working and getting just forty percent...you can
do something for hundred Rand, the boss going to pay you forty Rand. Imagine
for the month how much you're going to get! After that, I started to think about
having my own place. To have also the shop here is really difficult. I learned this
place my friend she was renting here... she told me, you cannot continue
working for the people – you can take my place. And then I came here – since
I'm here it’s been one year already.

MN: And is business good?

J: No! You know, outside earlier is not the same...sometime you get money to
eat and pay rent, that's all. Because if you don't get money, I [would have to]
sleep outside…I'm a woman, I [would have to] to start to selling my body…the
way I am here, it's better…all this place, I pay two thousand something. I live in
that room and share another room. I'm not here alone, I have other people here
renting [chairs].

When asked how much she made from a typical job, Janette responded in a way that
reveals how seriously she considers the livelihoods of the other braiders in her shop,
even when her own financial situation is precarious:
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J: It depends - you can braid for one-fifty, two hundred, some eighty Rand,
hundred Rand. It depends what the person wants. And also, I'm not going to plait
alone, I'm going to plait with my sisters – you need to share the money…you see
like now, it’s quiet, no one here. Sometimes you can have customers, like three,
four customers here, it depends. Like now it’s the month end, it's supposed to be
busy, but it's quiet.

Over the course of the interviews, it became clear that working in a salon was
considered a ‘natural’ job for migrant women. While for the Zimbabwean male artisans
interviewed, being self-employed was a way of publicly staking their agency through
evident self-employment, women working as hair-braiders and running salons do not
actively frame themselves as self-employed, but rather describe this work as ‘better’
than the alternative of selling their bodies. Although hard to determine if it is because of
pre-existing cultural stereotypes or merely convenience, two separate Congolese ethnic
organizations interviewed for this study were already either involved with or in the
planning stages of a program that would help migrant women start their own hair
salons. The fact that both organizations appeared to be run almost exclusively by men
suggests that hair-braiding is seen as a job that is ‘appropriate’ for a woman – perhaps
because it is a service that is largely performed by women for other women.

Hair-braiding salons are an example of migrants employing other migrants, and an
almost unique example of an industry where, by and large, women train and employ
other women. As with hawking and trading, some of the hair-braiders interviewed had
received financial or other assistance from a friend or family member in helping them
get established, but they in turn helped others. Based on the stories of women like
Janette, and similarly to the experiences of traders like Joyce and Fowsiyo, it also seems
to be an occupation in which migrants are able to achieve upward mobility, unlike the
low-level trap of domestic service.
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4.3 Business Robberies and Sexual Violence

An extremely common theme that emerged in the study, particularly when asking
Somali residents about their businesses, was the considerable amount of violence that
many experience, particularly in township areas of Cape Town. Two of the men -- both
spaza shop owners originally from Somalia – described armed robberies that were
considerably more violent than those related by other respondents. Both men described
multiple occasions when they, or those they were with, had been threatened and
physically attacked in the course of armed robberies. Mahmoud had large scars on his
leg and stomach from when he was shot while operating his shop. After being attacked
and having the stock from his shop plundered, he was hospitalized for twenty-three days
for complications related to the attack. Ali Mohamed, who had previously operated a
shop in Khayelitsha, and was operating one in Mitchell’s Plain at the time of the
interview, had also experienced multiple armed robberies. His shop assistant had also
been critically wounded after having been stoned by a group of youths. He summed up
his experience as follows:

As for safety, it is very bad in South Africa for refugees, especially for
Somalians. If they see [a] Somalian, they think they've got money. But money is
very difficult – if you sell sweets and what-what, and small groceries, if you sell
that stuff, maybe, plus minus, you can get more than R2,000 or R3,000 per
month. Then, early in the morning, you wake up, you try and buy some stock.
The people, they see this money and they think that you've got a lot of money

Both men’s experiences reflect a common pattern in which Somali traders operating
businesses in townships are disproportionately affected by some kinds of crime –
particularly business robberies that include looting, arson and murder (Gastrow & Amit,
2012). Many migrant shop owners often sleep in their shops in order to try and prevent
theft. Not only is the level and frequency of such crimes alarming, it has serious
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consequences for the livelihoods of traders. Robberies from shops, often of cell phone
air-time credits or other valuable items, cut sharply into their monthly earnings and
represent a considerable strain on their livelihood. Furthermore, given the difficulty of
accessing the free health care to which refugees and asylum seekers have a right
(Landau, 2006), injuries sustained while working in dangerous areas constitute a further
financial drain on shop operators.

Not only male participants are affected by the increased violence in township areas. As
a part of a very violent society, tens of thousands of South Africans and non-nationals
report instances of sexual violence every year. While in 2006-2007, 52,617 offenses of
rape were recorded by the police (Rumney & van der Bijl, 2010), it is impossible to
know how many rapes go unreported. Kihato (2007) notes that many female migrants
do not report their experiences of sexual assault to the police because they are
undocumented, and fearful of deportation. As a documented migrant, a young Somali
woman, named Fadumo, was working in a clothing shop in Khayelitsha when she was
raped by two South African men. Fearful of becoming an object of malicious gossip,
and without family of her own to support her, she decided to remain quiet:

I didn't tell anybody. If I told people, two men raped me… everyone [would say]
‘hey, this woman, she got raped’ nobody [would] talk to me, nobody [would]
give me something, and then, [maybe] some people [would say] ‘she sick maybe
she got HIV’. There’s another people [that were] rape[d], and that is why I am
scared and why I just keep quiet.

Without telling anyone about what had happened to her, she left her job in Khayelitsha,
and became an itinerant clothing seller, traveling from city to city, selling men’s
clothing to Somali businessmen too busy to shop for themselves, and begging for
temporary housing, normally only a day or two, from understanding Somali families
along the way. Worried about having her secret discovered, it took over a year for
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Fadumo to visit Cape Town’s Rape Crisis Centre, where she was able to take an HIV
test (she tested negative). Fadumo was unable to receive counselling because she did
not speak Afrikaans, Xhosa or English well enough to communicate with a counsellor,
and no interpretation services were available. Fadumo still refrained from going to the
police in order to keep her experience secret from the Somali community in South
Africa, to protect her reputation and maintain her network of weak social ties, an
essential part of her livelihood. While the importance of these ties is discussed in more
depth in Chapter 5, the important point for now is the gendered nature of violent attacks
and their social outcomes. Unlike her male counterparts, who were able to speak openly
about the physical violence they had been victim of while working, Fadumo remained
silent, compartmentalising an extremely difficult experience, and endangering her
health.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated various forms of livelihood practised by forced migrants
living in Cape Town, using individual narratives to draw out the diversity of their
experiences. The reasons why an individual fails or succeeds involve an intersection of
personal, structural and contingent factors. In addition to acquiring skills, training, and
experience, improved livelihoods frequently depend on access to social and kinship
networks and the kindness or generosity of others, especially for establishing an
informal enterprise and in enabling movement from informal to more formal
employment. Pre-migration experiences and particular family circumstances also play a
role in determining the opportunities and constraints that migrants encounter. Pressure
from family members in the home country to remit earnings can impede migrants’
economic progress, but personal networks can also be sources of financial and other
forms of support to engage in entrepreneurial activity in the first place.
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Gender is another important factor. As several of the women’s narratives in this chapter
have shown, encouragement or opposition from a spouse or other family members can
determine livelihood pathways, and influence whether they can embark on any form of
income-earning occupation at all. In addition, certain migrant occupations are heavily
gendered, such as women in hair braiding and men in craft production and sales, or
construction work for males and domestic service for females engaged in casual labour.
Within trading and hawking activities, the women in this study were engaged in more
marginal and less secure forms of trade, such as itinerant selling or roadside stalls,
whereas it was men who ran spaza shops. While this does not mean that men’s
livelihoods are necessarily easier to secure, it does demonstrate the importance of
gender in determining migrants’ incorporation into the labour market, whether formal or
informal.

Another conclusion from the study is that a rigid distinction between formal and
informal ‘sectors’ is not especially helpful in understanding the livelihood strategies and
pathways of forced migrants. Self-employment or small enterprise is a better description
of some occupations, such as running spaza shops or hair-braiding salons. Even the
trading and artisanal production systems are embedded in complex procurement and
value chains that extend beyond South Africa, intersecting with the formal wholesale
and retail sectors in multiple ways. Seemingly unorganized casual employment is
connected to labour recruitment agencies and can in practice be more regular and
‘quasi-formal’ than at first appears. What is also apparent is that refugees and other
forced migrants are restricted in their labour options and economic mobility, whether by
exploitative employers, bureaucratic and legal hurdles, or hostility from South African
nationals. This matches findings from other studies of urban refugee livelihoods, both in
other South African cities and elsewhere in the world. As Buscher (2011, p. 25) has
concluded: ‘Regardless of the economic coping strategies employed, the majority of
urban refugees, while demonstrating a high level of resilience, remain on the fringes of
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the economies in which they live. For many their survival is day-to-day, hand-to-mouth
subsistence joining the ranks of the urban poor.’
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CHAPTER 5: COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS

5.1 Introduction

For those working informally, the state is only ‘one candidate among many’ in
organizing one’s economic life (Meagher, 2010). There has been an increased interest
among academics engaged in work relating to the informal economy, in the power of
‘social networking’ to explain economic behaviour.

This field of economics

investigates how informal organizations and institutions based on social ties such as
friendship, kinship, ethnicity and location, can replace the formal roles of the state
(Totolo, 2013). Migration scholars, who have widely acknowledged the importance of
social networking in the migration process for many years (Boyd, 1989), describe it as a
dynamic and flexible process that can easily adapt to the host community (Castles,
2004; Nyamnjoh, 2014). The diverse tactics that forced migrants use in Cape Town are
excellent examples of social networking. As this chapter will demonstrate, participants
utilize both weak and strong ties order to ensure their basic material and social security,
and in so doing, draw upon a range of different relationships and entitlements in their
day-to-day lives. This chapter explores the ways in which, in the context of a highly
xenophobic environment, participants make use of these institutions and relationships,
and argues that these strategies have significant consequences for the security of forced
migrant livelihoods.

In order to demonstrate this, the chapter is organized into two separate sections, which
together comprise an analysis of the series of tactics participants use in constructing and
supporting their livelihoods. Not all participants I spoke to were connected with formal
ethnic associations or money saving groups, and so these migrants had to manage their
money, and navigate their precarity, through more individual agency. The first section
explores the experiences of these participants through the series of tactics they use in
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order to secure work, save money, find housing and gain access to banking in the formal
economy. In the second section, I explore how several Congolese ethnic associations
draw upon a sense of shared identity in order to manage club savings and skill training
programs for the benefit of their members. I conclude that both individual and
communal strategies play an important role not only in providing social support to
forced migrants, but also in offering essential financial stability.

5. 2 Individual Day-to-Day Tactics and Social Networking

A high-unemployment economy, difficult access to legal documentation, and a distrust
of foreigners and their documents amongst South Africans, together make it difficult for
forced migrants to find work in the formal economy (Landau et al., 2005). Before
forced migrants are able to connect with community associations, they navigate a series
of individual challenges, including finding work, accessing banking and coping with
meagre and irregular incomes. This section takes an inventory of some of the most
common and effective tactics used in order to combat these challenges. At first glance,
these strategies may seem atomized and individual, but when considered broadly a
pattern emerges, wherein such seemingly minor tactics and slight transgressions,
playing on pre-existing racial scripts constitute an important set of tools that help forced
migrants mitigate their precarity.

5.2.1.Financial Literacy and Budgeting

While visiting the new home of two Congolese participants, a roomy bedroom with a
double mattress, fridge, clothes rack and somewhat mouldy walls, I looked down to see
several pounds of meat, mostly ribs, sitting in a box by the door. After jokingly asking if
the two young men were planning on hosting a braai, I was informed that this meat had
been bought in bulk for the next month’s worth of meals. This conversation about
budgeting was one of many that I had with participants from all different backgrounds,

68

many of whom were conversant with the idea of saving money, but lacked the funds to
do so. This following excerpt, shared by Yves, a 32-year-old single man from DRC,
reveals the small scale at which this budgeting takes place:
When you get a hundred rand, you know you have to eat [only] twenty rand,
because eighty rand you must keep it for tomorrow…maybe I’ll stay two, three
months at home again with no work. It’s up and down, up and down, that is the
way we survive.

The box of meat I had observed was the first time I had seen for myself the various
money-saving techniques that are often used by cash-strapped households. This
example was one of the most prevalent ways to make money stretch by buying in bulk,
a strategy which helped to ensure household food security. Mabel, an assistant manager
at a Southern Suburbs restaurant and mother of two originally from eastern Congo, buys
all of her groceries in bulk at the beginning of the month. Mabel notes that living costs,
including groceries, have increased since she arrived. In 2008 her family’s monthly
groceries cost R500 rand; now she pays around R1,500 rand a month. Despite these
added pressures, she and her husband, Joseph, a self-employed barber, also from eastern
Congo, through careful budgeting, were able to stretch their income to cover the rent of
their Wynberg apartment, (R3,800 /month), buy a car, and cover their childcare costs.

Sometimes frugality can be about more than ensuring household food security. Patricia,
a vegetable stall operator from Zimbabwe, remits over half her income home each
month to her parents and siblings. For her, buying only the essentials is not a mere act
of accounting, but a way of asserting her temporary relationship with the city. As she
told me:

Us, we are foreigners, and actually we are not permanent here. So actually, when
we are using our money, we don’t waste our money. Like, if you want to buy

69

food, you buy food at the end of the month, for the whole month...so don’t just
go Shoprite buy, bread, no. Buy for the whole month.

Budgeting is more than ensuring food security, but can also affect personal financial
security, and make new livelihood opportunities possible. When Joseph quit his job at
Vide e Caffe, a high-end coffee chain, because of poor working conditions and lesser
pay than his South African counterparts, it was the R8,000 his wife had saved that
enabled him to open a barbershop several months later. This was accomplished by
strictly budgeting their income, a feat she had managed only by lying to her husband
about their finances.

On such small incomes, budgeting is an essential tool that can empower households to
save for the future or start businesses. Unfortunately, financial literacy is not universal,
and in fact, amongst urban refugees, even those operating their own businesses, levels
of financial literacy are surprisingly low (Buscher, 2011). For Bondeko, the owner of a
refrigerator repair shop in Mowbray originally from rural DRC, financial planning was
not something he or his family was familiar with. Like many refugees worldwide,
Bondeko and his family were originally from a rural area (of DRC) where they owned
their own house and were able to farm (Jacobsen, 2005). Moving to the city, where
budgeting to pay for rent, food and three different sets of school fees is essential, was
something Saleh, his wife, told me they found foreign and stressful compared to their
memories of living in the DRC.

Over the three months that I knew the family, they steadily slid into increasing
precarity and poverty linked partially to serious illness, but also to poor financial
planning. After running out of family savings, Bondeko was forced to sell most of their
furniture in order to pay rent. By the time I ended my fieldwork, the family of seven had
moved out of their apartment, and were living in the repair shop’s workspace, unsure of
how to pay several months of back rent. At this point, like many forced migrants barely
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surviving, Bondeko and his family would not have been able to take advantage of
budgeting anyway, as they do not have enough cash to buy groceries in bulk or put
away savings – demonstrating that this tactic is only useful for those with enough
available cash to buy in bulk. While household budgeting can be a powerful tool for
forced migrants with low incomes, there remains a divide between those who are
financially able to budget and those who, due to unemployment, intermittent income or
low financial literacy, cannot.

For those participants able to afford it, across household composition, ethnicity and
form of employment, budgeting earnings and food emerged as an important method of
managing their precarious situation, and thus, at least partially, prepare for an uncertain
financial future. While for some participants this was their primary form of ‘insurance’,
others combined this strategy with club savings programs, discussed further in section
5.3.

5.2.2 Smart Strategies with Banking and Racial/Ethnic Scripts
Participants with status as asylum seekers and refugees faced persistent problems in
opening and maintaining access to bank accounts (see section 3.5). Whether by being
denied permission to open an account, or having that account closed or frozen when
legal documents expire, participants faced several serious hurdles to utilizing banking
services. The majority of participants dealt with this exclusion the same way that over
25% of South Africans do – by avoiding banking altogether and working exclusively in
the cash economy (Finscope, 2011).

The motivations against banking varied amongst participants. Some did not feel the
need to have a bank account: for small business owners, such as hawkers and spaza
shop owners dealing in cash, banking fees signify an unnecessary expense, as all of
their savings are converted into stock for their shops. Country of origin also plays a
role: several Zimbabwean participants had ZDP permits, which makes it easier to open
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an account. Other Zimbabweans in the asylum system were able to return home or remit
money home regularly enough for a South African bank account to not be of particular
concern. Amongst participants, it was mainly Congolese participants (both from the
Republic of Congo and DRC) that, due to the difficulty of remitting money home, their
protracted time in South Africa, and the higher likelihood of working in the formal
economy, were most interested in accessing bank accounts.

In South Africa, most employers prefer to pay wages through direct deposit into
employees’ bank accounts. For this reason, participants working through Fundi or in
other more formalized jobs need bank accounts in order to conduct their business and to
be paid for their labour. Many found innovative solutions to sidestep the obstacles put in
place by banks.

One strategy particularly popular amongst casual workers for Fundi was to have office
staff deposit their pay into a co-worker’s account. While an elegant solution for the
migrant employee, this approach has two main problems. The first is that it requires
finding a co-worker who is reliable, trustworthy and willing to provide ongoing access
to their bank account. The second is that it is cumbersome and not easily replicable. As
a not-for-profit organization with the specific intention of easing access into the skilled
workforce, it is within Fundi’s unspoken organizational mandate to undertake such a
process, which normally involves multiple phone calls between different employees,
and a good administrative ability to not confuse different people (and their bank
accounts). Given how cumbersome this process is, it would be difficult to find other
organizations or employers willing to undertake this level of extra work in order to pay
their employees. A second tactic was much less common. One participant, Raphael,
secured his account by asking a South African friend to open up an account on his
behalf. This is a risky proposition, as the bank account is in the name of the South
African accomplice, and so that person would be able to withdraw money or close the
account without the permission of the forced migrant. While not having a bank account
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can hinder upwards mobility and business ventures, neither of these strategies offers a
sustainable solution, forcing participants to rely on the charity of their employers, coworkers or friends in order to gain access to banking.

For those with bank accounts, the account was normally seen as an asset that should be
protected. Another, more successful and better established participant, Claude from
Brazzaville, had opened a bank account years ago, and used it often in the course of his
successful business as a building contractor. As a contractor, Claude needs a bank
account in order to run his business, as it is the only way clients can deposit large sums
of money for him to buy materials and complete his contract. For this reason, Claude
told me he was extremely diligent in ensuring that his legal papers were up to date, and
that he had constant access to his bank account. As a part of this, he always made sure
to perform transactions in more affluent areas of Cape Town, where he felt he was less
likely to have problems. When in the bank, he ensured that he worked with either a
coloured or white teller. He felt so strongly about this that he would let people go in
front of him, in order to ensure that he did not bank with a black South African teller,
who he claimed were less lenient and patient with foreigners. Another contractor, Yves
from DRC, admitted somewhat reticently to using the same strategy to keep his account
open. Although he lived in Mitchell’s Plain,

I only went to the Bellville bank [where he first opened his account]...what I can
say, it's not like I'm making that thing in bad way, but it was like, [there were]
only white people there, so it was like, easy.

The tactics of these two men reflect a sentiment I heard repeated again and again by
participants: namely, that it was specifically black South Africans (often referred to as
‘Xhosas’, which is the dominant black African ethnic group in the Western Cape) that
resented their presence in South Africa the most. While statistically representative
surveys have determined that South Africans are highly xenophobic, regardless of race,
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gender, or language (Crush et al, 2008), this issue does have nuance that cannot be
captured in national surveys. When describing my research to white South Africans, I
was often told that foreigners were good workers, or worked hard, or were ‘so polite’.
This was most memorably brought home by a conversation I had with a young, upper
class white South African man, who commented to me there was something about
Congolese that was more ‘sophisticated’ and ‘civilized’ than other Africans he had
encountered. While his racist comments were supposed to support his claim that
migrants from the DRC make particularly good waiters, his comments betrayed feelings
I am sure not only he held: that some migrants are in some ways different or superior to
black South Africans. Claude and Yves, in deliberately only banking with coloured or
white tellers, were aware of, and deliberately taking advantage of these local racial (or
ethnic) scripts in order to further their own interests. Indeed, amongst the Congolese
participants I spoke with, many were aware that making a ‘good impression’ could pay
great dividends. Based on the good impression he made on the owner of the house
where he worked as a security guard (see 4.2), Raphael was given funds to enrol in a
waiter-training program, and a job in a high-end restaurant upon completion. Another
sign of this awareness is a short notice placed in a monthly Congolese newspaper,
entitled Congo Square, which encourages Congolese to resist stealing from grocery
stores, and instead ‘ask a brother or social agency for help’ (see Appendix A).

Whether by networking strategically amongst co-workers and friends, or by taking
advantage of the pre-existing racial scripts in their host country, migrants have proved
resourceful in finding access to formal banking when the system seeks to exclude them.
While some participants drew upon a series of weak ties in order to use others’ accounts
to achieve certain objectives, other participants were able to exploit fault lines in South
African race relations in order to open their own accounts. With this added security and
stature, these participants were better able to start and run their own businesses, engage
in the formal economy, and employ other foreigners as well. In the following section,
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the role that individual networking plays in helping newcomers integrate into the city is
discussed further.

5.2.3 Housing
As Cape Town’s population grows, so too does competition for housing, particularly for
low-cost housing. In addition to navigating the hyper-segregated nature of Cape Town’s
neighbourhoods (McDonald, 2014), forced migrants enter into a competitive housing
market, where they are forced to compete with poor locals for a place to live. They must
do this without permanent employment, local references, or even, having just recently
arrived, enough money for a deposit (Jacobsen, 2005: 44). In circumstances such as
this, social networking is a crucial tool in helping newcomers integrate into the host
society (Massey et al., 1993) and locate housing. Choices in housing are directly linked
to livelihoods, not only determining personal safety, but also representing a major
expense in migrants’ lives.

The choice of where to live is among the most important decisions a migrant can make.
Amongst participants, a significant portion had chosen to live in inner-city areas of the
city, forgoing the significantly lower rents on offer in township areas. When asked why
this was the case, participants would reference the townships as areas of violence.
According to participants, townships were unsafe. Living there, they felt they would be
more likely to be targeted for attack, based on the fact that they are not South African.
While many participants were struggling to make ends meet financially, many placed a
premium on continuing to live in areas that were safer – even when it meant a
significant percentage of their overall budget. Many participants would share living
space, bedrooms and sometimes even beds with other migrants in order to afford the
more expensive rents (between R1,500 and R3,000 a month for a bedroom) in more
central locations.

75

While not in any way representative, only four of thirty-two participants I spoke with
were living in townships, despite the fact that rent can be up to ten times more in the
city proper. During one interview, I asked two young Congolese why they chose to rent
a single room together in Mowbray, rather than stay in a township. As a part of their
reply, they showed me a series of graphic photos on their phones of a man who had
been eviscerated and left for dead. While many of the details were fuzzy, they were
adamant that this man was a foreigner, and had been killed in a Cape Town township
for a small theft. Through a combination of word-of-mouth and mobile networks, news
of these incidents travels quickly, and plays a motivating role in where migrants chose
to settle in the city.

All participants indicated that upon their arrival in Cape Town, they used some form of
social networking in order to locate their first accommodation. For those who did not
join friends or kin already living in the city, one main method of social networking,
referred to here as ‘co-ethnic hosting’, was used. Many forced migrants used shared
ethnicity or nationality as a conversation opener with possible other co-ethnics, in the
hope of asking for financial support, or even for temporary accommodations. One
participant, a young Congolese man named Yves, describes how he used his language
abilities to begin the lengthy process through which he secured his own housing when
arriving in the city in 2005:

You stand in Cape Town station, there is people passing around…so you can
see by looking the face, or what he's wearing. You just say no, this is mine. I can
... just move on him! I say 'bonjour' when he answer you back, so you…start
talking, you ask him; you speak Lingala? Chiluba? Swahili? …you get from
there, start to talk, you get from him ten rand, twenty rand, to buy something. It
took time, like two or three months, I was still with not a fixed place - staying in
churches.
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Since his arrival in 2005, Yves has encountered many of the most common experiences
of forced migrants, including sharing a crowded apartment in Gardens with sixteen
occupants, and having to move multiple times due to high rents. His past struggles
securing housing and a livelihood have informed his current attitude towards
newcomers as well. Remembering how hard it was for him, when asked, he hosts
newcomers in his home in Mitchell’s Plain, a room which he shares with two other
people. This method of co-ethnic hosting is not just limited to Congolese newcomers.
Chiaka, a hair salon owner originally from Nigeria, was able to find housing more
easily. Below, he explained how he found a roommate by hanging out in the Southern
Suburb of Observatory:

I was staying with my friend, he was here before me...we met on the street.
When I spoke to him, and when he reply to me, I find that he is Nigerian guy –
because of intonation. I say what part of you? He says he’s from Anambra – that
is my province. I start telling him my story – that I have just come, that I don’t
know anybody, that I’m new person here...and he say ‘okay, no problem’. As
I’m a Nigerian, I can stay with him until I get a job.

Chiaka and Yves’ stories are examples of a strategy for creating and using weak social
ties that I heard from many different sources. But while this housing strategy had a
worked well for men, it did not for lone female participants. In their study of the gender
differences of Senegalese and Congolese networks, Toma and Vause (2014) found that
unlike their male compatriots, who are able to draw on both weak and strong ties,
female migrants rely more heavily on the strong ties of long-term migrants and family
members in their own migration. Sharing accommodation with relative strangers – a
strategy used by many – runs the risk of theft and physical and sexual violence, to
which female migrants are more susceptible (Jacobsen, 2005). These findings seem to
hold true in the experiences of single female forced migrants coming to Cape Town as
well. This can lead to widely different trajectories between male and female forced
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migrants. After her first Somali co-national host was resettled as a refugee in Canada,
Fowsiyo, a 19-year-old Somali, was left without employment, a wide social network, or
a strong command of English. Without viable options to secure reliable housing, she
opted for what seemed most expedient at the time:

The time she left, the lady, I got a guy, the guy told me, I will help you, will you
marry me? And then I told him ‘Yes, I’ll marry you’. But [it was] not my choice,
I marry because I don’t have place I’m sleeping, I don’t have money.

This study found that because men had a wider range of socially acceptable housing
options, they were more successful in finding housing than their female counterparts.
This accords with findings by other scholars, such as Nyamnjoh’s study of
Cameroonians living in Cape Town, who found that women’s social networks were
more limited than men’s, reducing their access to help and support. This was certainly
the case for Fowsiyo, who was unable to sleep on the street or live unmarried with men,
and so secured her accommodation through marrying a man who, may have hosted men,
but not women, out of pure generosity. Despite being a consistent factor in women’s
migration narratives, this gendered aspect to social networking is often excluded from
literature on kinship networks (Nyamnjoh, 2014) and often leads to analysis that is
‘gender blind’ (Gidengil & O’Neil, 2006:2). Taking into consideration the differing
tactics available to both male and female participants is an important way to draw out
the gendered implication of social networking, which can be easy to overlook if not
directly compared. As the next section will explore more fully, men and women
network differently in community spaces, in addition to in their individual lives, which
has an overall effect on their (lack of) representation in these informal power structures.
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5.3 Ethnic Community Associations
5.3.1 Group Networking
In the final weeks of my fieldwork, one of my participants, Bondeko, introduced me to
five different community associations. Of the five groups, three of them had members
specifically from different areas of Eastern Congo, while the other two groups included
members from all over the DRC. These associations, while regarded broadly as an
occasion for Congolese to come together to socialize and network, also provide
important social and economic opportunities to members. In addition to networking and
money saving schemes, many associations provide access to a series of informal
services, such as emergency medical transportation and protection, for example by
making contingency plans for xenophobic outbreaks.

Amisi and Ballard (2005) and Amisi (2005) have explored how Congolese living in
Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town use ethnic associations for survival. In their
investigation, Amisi and Ballard provided a thorough political and historical context for
the presence and function of these organizations in South Africa, beyond the scope of
what can reasonably be outlined here. Most importantly for this thesis, they recognize
that similar saving schemes existed in South Africa from as early as the 1930s, known
as stokvels or ‘homeboy’ networks, and were used by rural South Africans who had
moved to urban areas (Mamdani, 1996:193). Amisi and Ballard argue that for
Congolese living in South Africa, this powerful survivalist tool is rooted in the DRC’s
postcolonial history. In the DRC, citizens have coped with the decades of government
neglect by forming grassroots support networks to provide the services that the state
could or would not. In South Africa, Congolese refugees have recreated these
community structures in order to establish networks of social support in their new home
(Amisi and Ballard 2005:2). While the original function of these associations may be
rooted in DRC’s colonial history, they take on a new meaning in the South African
context. The structural difficulties and xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners in South
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Africa were identified as the main motivating factors for the founding of these
associations, stating ‘we come together here [the association] because society here
doesn’t open up to foreigners’. Read against the feelings of exclusion that participants
express, ethnic associations enable members to pass on cultural values to their South
African-born children, and create a ‘home-away-from-home’ (Nyamnjoh, 2014:203).

5.3.2 Group Savings
All five ethnic associations operated basic group savings programs, which offer
emergency funds in certain situations, and are drawn from monthly collections from all
members. Each group meets at the end of each month, when members are most likely to
have money. In the course of these meetings, various community issues are discussed
and donations, determined by ability to pay, are taken for the joint fund. This process
does not manage a tremendous amount of money – in a typical month, around a hundred
members are able to gather between R1,500 and R3,000 This fund is then used towards
a variety of essential payments for members, such as funerals, weddings, repatriation of
relatives, medical emergencies, and cash support for unemployed members and
widowed or abandoned women and children for groceries and rent. These funds are
crucial because, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 4, the incomes of most members
are unpredictable and insecure. As one community member noted, in an association of
over 120 members, ‘no one is working a good job, not a single one! No office jobs’. For
the forced migrants involved in these associations, forming or joining a savings groups
like this is one of the only ways of expressing agency, through mitigating their
individual levels of precarity.

While the concept of savings clubs, sometimes called ROSTAs (Rotating Savings and
Credit Associations) is widely replicated by both internal and cross-border migrants in
South Africa (Bähre, 2002) and worldwide (Ardener & Burman, 1995), the small loans
that participating Congolese associations distribute are not necessarily typical across
different ethnicities and circumstances. In her study of Cameroonians living in Cape
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Town, Nyamnjoh (2014) finds that the ethnic associations of Pinyin and Mankon, who
use similar savings programs to provide micro-loans to a similar number of members,
distribute several thousand rand each month, and occasionally as much as R25,000
(2014: 184). In contrast to my informants, who had considerably smaller businesses and
poorer access to formal banking, the members of the groups Nyamnjoh visited had bank
accounts both in Cameroon and South Africa, and used electronic transfers to remit
their savings back to Cameroon, for the purposes of supporting family, aiding in local
development projects and for financial safe-keeping in case of refoulement or
deportation. While for Nyamnjoh’s participants engaging in this form of banking was a
way of protecting pre-existing assets, for the participants of this study, savings clubs
programs were an essential part of their day-to-day financial worlds. Excluded from
formal banking, and unable to access loans from UNHCR partners, where the process of
getting funds is lengthy, degrading and sometimes fruitless, group savings plans can be
a rapid and reliable way of for migrants to access a larger sum of money if needed.

5.3.3 Skill Training and Employment Programs
There are few formal opportunities for forced migrants to access financial and practical
assistance in starting a small business or accessing employment. In the course of my
fieldwork, I found that while organizations such as ARESTA, Adonis Musati Project
and Red Cross all provide important short and medium term humanitarian grants to
cover rent and school fees, none of them offer business loans or grants. Only one Cape
Town based organization, The Cape Town Refugee Centre (CTRC) offers support, in
the form of small grants of between R500 to R5000 (Hoeflich, 2014). The program’s
success, however, is hindered by a lengthy intake process that takes over a year for
participants to access funds, and the lack of skill training or education about money
management (ibid).

By contrast, ethnic associations are able to provide easier to access start-up funding and
be more engaged and invested with the business as it grows. An example of an
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association that has been successful is VIDEFI, an ethnic association that has launched
successful skills training programs in aesthetics and tailoring. During the fieldwork
portion of this research, the program was training five women in each of the two
programs, representing three different countries, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Zimbabwe and South Africa, with a total of ten women in the program. Women are
taught the basic skills behind the trades, and also develop experience selling their
products and operating the business before striking out on their own.

While other ethnic associations have attempted to emulate this model, for example by
starting a hair salon and crèche, they have so far been unsuccessful. This is not due to
lack of will or capability on the part of these other associations, but rather their inability
to fulfill the legal requirements necessary to start said programs. While it remains
unclear how VIDEFI was able to open their business bank account, it is obvious that
their success is the exception, rather than the rule. MUREMA for example, an ethnic
association for Congolese members from the Maniema province of the DRC, was
seeking funding in order to open a crèche and hair salon, but the endeavour was
frustrated by their lack of access to formal banking.

For obvious reasons, non-profit associations must conduct their affairs from business
bank accounts in order to receive funding through grants or donations. This is an issue,
as refugees and asylum seekers, the majority of whom are not permanent residents in
South Africa, are unable to open a business bank account for the association. While I
was unable to find a specific piece of legislation that confirms the lived experience of
multiple participants, there are several pieces of evidence that suggests that participants’
experiences are accurate. The first is it that it conforms to larger regulatory trends that
address forced migrants and banking institutions. As previously mentioned in 3.4,
forced migrants experience difficulties accessing formal banking services. In May 2010,
South Africa’s FIC (Financial Intelligence Centre) announced that banks were not
allowed to transact with asylum seekers based on the official permits and certificates by
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the Department of Home Affairs, preventing many forced migrants from accessing their
funds in pre-existing accounts (Lawack, 2013: 339). This decision was reversed on
September 9th 2010, when Lawyers for Human Rights, along with the Consortium for
Refugees and Migrants in South Africa brought an application to the high court in
Johannesburg, who successfully argued that permits from DHA be considered
acceptable identification (ibid). While currently these permits are accepted as identity
documents, under the 2010 regulations to prevent money laundering, FICA seems to
empower individual banks to determine whether or not individual migrants pose a
financial risk. The second piece of evidence is forced migrants’ general difficulty in
opening up even individual bank accounts, despite their legal right to do so. The reasons
for this difficulty may be banks refusing to take on the risk of migrant accounts, as
demonstrated in the letter from First National Bank (FNB) officials to ARESTA (see
appendices). Finally, the online application for a business account with FNB, the bank
considered one of the most likely to provide formal banking to migrants (UCT, n.d)
specifically notes that ‘FNB must verify the identity of all persons defined by the FIC
Act as Related Parties before any account may be activated’ and that the person opening
the account ‘must be a South African Resident and have a green-bar-coded RSA ID
book’16.

Given how few Congolese have been able to naturalize or obtain permanent residence,
and certainly do not have green-bar-coded RSA ID books, it is unlikely that MUREMA,
and other groups like them, will be able to access private funding through grants for
grassroots initiatives. This banking barrier against opening business accounts represents
a lost opportunity not only for entrepreneurs hoping to open or expand their businesses,
but also ethnic associations and non-profits that hope to create social enterprises that
could benefit the wider community. This roadblock signifies a loss to the South African
citizens as well as forced migrants. In the spirit of Landau’s call for programming that
16

Sourced from the First National Bank website at
https://www.fnb.co.za/Sales/main.jsp accessed April 1, 2015.
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moves away from ‘bespoke’ programming exclusively for refugees (2014: 143) some
migrant associations are already providing services to interested South Africans,
including VIDEFI’s tailoring training program and the business skills workshops
offered by the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA) located in Bellville (Daily
Maverick, 2015). Not only do these programs provide economic opportunities to
individuals in need of assistance, but they could also serve as a venue for South
Africans and non-nationals, including forced migrants, to interact in a positive
environment.

5.3.4 Social Networking and Community Services
The monthly association meetings enable Congolese from across the Greater Cape
Town area to connect and network with others from different parts of the DRC.
Through the large monthly meetings, these associations are also useful venues to access
information about formal and informal employment opportunities (Amisi, 2005, AlSharmani, 2003 and El-Abed, 2003) and important information regarding forced
migrants’ legal status in South Africa. Members see the association as a place to meet.
This is particularly true for funerals and weddings, where it is expected that all
Congolese go to pay their respects (Amisi and Ballard, 2005).

Through social

networking, these meetings serve a larger function, in supplementing or in some cases
even replacing the often-inadequate civil services available to migrants and South
Africans alike.

In their investigations into medical xenophobia, Crush and Tawodzera (2011) find that
within a healthcare system that is overburdened and in an advanced state of disrepair
Zimbabwean migrants do experience discrimination based on documentation, poor
communication, verbal abuse and xenophobic statements and insults. These findings
echo issues with medical services noted by participants, such as MUREMA’S response
to the discriminatory treatment of Cape Town Emergency Medical Services.
Participants reported that, when speaking with the dispatcher, if they had trouble
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communicating in Afrikaans or English, dispatchers would sometimes disconnect the
call, similar to Crush and Tawodzera’s findings that medical practitioners will
deliberately use local languages with foreign patients, as a way of underscoring their
powerlessness and other-ness. Participants complained that EMS had unacceptably slow
response rates, particularly in townships, where an ambulance may not come at all, or if
it did, only after several hours. In response, the association developed a list of members
with cars able to provide transportation if a medical situation arises. If needed, any
member of the association can call these numbers, and transportation will be arranged to
bring them to the hospital. Similarly, in the course of community meetings, contingency
plans have been made for possible future xenophobic attacks. This process is similar,
and involves phone trees and a prearranged action plan in order to extricate members
from affected townships and informal settlements, all without the use of public
transportation such as public taxis and trains.

5.3.5 Gender in Ethnic Associations
Despite one of the main stated objectives of these associations being to financially aid
single women and children who are deemed ‘powerless’ without the collective’s
support, women were conspicuously absent in all ethnic associations that I visited. Like
Nyamnjoh’s fieldwork with Cape Town based Cameroonian ethnic associations, I also
found that women were confined to ‘marginal decision making processes’ (2014: 177),
and of the five associations, only one woman was in a leadership position, holding the
dubious honorific of Minister of Women and Children’s Affairs. Women were also
absent at the association’s monthly meetings. When I raised this issue, it was explained
to me was that most female members’ husbands were also members, so the women
stayed at home to take care of the children, who were considered too disruptive to
attend, while the husbands attended the meeting. This heavy gender distortion not only
places male migrants in the position of ‘helpers’ of victimized female migrants, but also
contributes to women having less widespread and more isolated social networks, and
hence less social mobility, than their male counterparts.
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5.3.6 Summary
In considering the role of social networking in forced migrants’ livelihood tactics, it is
obvious that both individual and community networking tactics are used. Individual
networking, typically composed of weak ties, tends to be used more effectively by male
forced migrants, while females face a more limited set of options. Community ethnic
associations play an important role in providing access to small and easily accessed
sums of money that would otherwise have been unavailable to participants. Finally, in
addition to these club savings programs, some ethnic associations are undertaking
economic empowerment programs, intended to provide training programs for their
members, but also available to other foreigners, as well as South Africans. Such
organizations provide a promising opportunity to not only enable forced migrant
livelihoods, but build positive social capital with their host society.

5.4 Conclusion
By considering the full economic lives of forced migrants, it is clear that in addition to
the wage and income earning activities discussed in Chapter 4, the individual tactics and
networking strategies that migrants use play an important role in securing their
livelihoods. The strategies, such as budgeting money and taking advantage of local
racial scripts, are an important part of participants being able to deploy what little
money they have in the most strategic way possible.

Both individual networking and interactions with ethnic associations help forced
migrants to gain access to a series of weak ties that enable them to access housing
opportunities, lump sums of money in emergency situations, and various kinds of skill
training programs, as well as to network in order to gain access to a wider variety of job
opportunities. In addition to fostering a sense of belonging, these ethnic associations
structure forced migrants’ interactions with each other, and act as a state-like structure
that provides community-styled grant programs, emergency medical services, and even
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disaster management.

At the same time, these processes and tactics are deeply

gendered, and offer a different portfolio of options to male and female participants,
leaving women to deal with more serious consequences due to their diminished social
networks and marginalized positions in ethnic organizations. While such non-monetary
tactics may, to a certain degree mitigate the considerable financial strain on forced
migrants’ livelihoods, their position remains financially and sometimes physically
perilous. In the words of one participant, while networking can help, for forced migrants
with insecure employment and living in a xenophobic and sometimes violent city, ‘not
only are you insecure socially, but you don’t know what your future holds for you’. In
the end, these strategies emerge only as a way of managing, rather than erasing that
insecurity.
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6. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARDS THE BIGGER PICTURE

6.1. Introduction
While South Africa has one of the most powerful economies on the continent, forced
migrants arriving in Cape Town encounter a city divided by vast income inequality,
embedded within a country with national unemployment rates of above 25 percent.
Unlike forcibly displaced migrants living in refugee camps and receiving humanitarian
aid, forced migrants in South Africa must be economically self-sufficient by taking part
in the South African economy. Despite their high rates of education rates and
willingness to work, their access to formal employment opportunities is hampered by
South African employers’ distrust of their paperwork and widespread xenophobia,
pushing many forced migrants into the informal economy. In response to this context,
this thesis set out to learn more about the economic activities of forced migrants
working outside of the formal economy, typically through working in the informal
economy or as casual labourers. In order to take a bottom up, people-centred approach
that drew out individual lived experiences, this thesis drew upon a livelihoods
framework, following in the approach of Vearey (2008) and Jacobsen (2005; 2006).
The following pair of interlinked questions guided the research and analysis: What
forms of informal employment or other income generating activities are forced migrants
in Cape Town using to secure their livelihoods? and what are the economic, social and
spatial factors that enable this employment?

Using data collected from semi-structured interviews with forced migrants and key
informants, the research for this thesis discovered that while the both disorganization
and corruption prevalent in the Department of Home Affairs and the persistent and
generalised hostility towards foreigners throughout South African society curtailed
participants’ economic activities, this was mediated by participants’ drawing upon a
series of formal and informal tactics and social relationships in order to secure their
livelihoods. The specifics of these, along with the overarching themes of the thesis, are
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summarized in the following section (6.1). In sections 6.2 and 6.3, I identify the
theoretical and policy implications of these findings, before discussing the limitations of
the study (6.4) and pointing to some areas for future research regarding the study of
livelihoods and forced migrants living in South Africa (6.5).

6.2 Main Findings

This thesis has considered the livelihood strategies of 32 forced migrants working
outside of the formal sector in South Africa. It has found that even amongst those
engaged in informal and casual labour, a diverse range of income earning modes were
employed. Participants engaged in entrepreneurship in sectors such as contracting, hair
salons, spaza shops and hawking, while those engaged in casual labour secured their
work either through the Fundi Network, or informally, through day labour or social
networking. Those engaged in casual labour were predominantly construction and
domestic workers. There was a marked heterogeneity of experiences: while many seem
trapped in low level employment, others, by drawing on transnational connections,
personal charm and luck, were able to negotiate their way into more formal (and secure)
employment. Three cross cutting themes were identified, each of which are explored in
turn in the following section: gender, the informal/formal divide, and instability and
precarity.

6.2.1 Gender
Gender was a factor that structured all aspects of participants’ economic and personal
lives, from their experiences at the Department of Home Affairs, to the sectors
participants became involved in, to the ways and extent to which they networked. With
separate queues for men and women at the Department of Home Affairs, despite the
prevalence of men among forced migrants, women experienced fewer frustrations in
renewing their permits, and reported less of an impact on their overall livelihoods and
access to legal status. Gender also shaped the choice of participants’ income-earning
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activities, as women were involved in hair salons, vegetable stalls and hawking, while
men were more likely to be involved in artisan work, spaza shops and casual labour.
This gender-influenced income earning extended into casual labour as well: men were
able to use Fundi as well as day-labour options to secure work, while only one woman
engaged in this form of labour, and only through Fundi. Casual labour opportunities for
‘female’ jobs such as dishwashing and domestic work were in less demand by potential
employers than typical ‘male’ jobs, such as painting and construction work. This made
it more difficult for female participants to find work using this resource. These gendered
livelihoods had further impacts on how participants networked socially. While men
could be hired as a part of a larger team of construction workers, which allowed them to
network with other foreigners, as well as South Africans, while building skills by
learning from their co-workers, women were normally registered as single domestic
workers or administrative assistants, jobs which were less common, socially isolating
and presented few opportunities to build skills. Within ethnic associations, women’s
roles were restricted to marginalized positions specifically designed for women.
Women’s presence in meetings was sparse, as most women were tasked with caring for
the children off-site.

6.2.2 Formal/Informal Divide
While this thesis set out to document the livelihoods of forced migrants working in the
informal economy, my findings suggest that rigidly distinguishing between formal and
informal ‘sectors’ may not be the most useful way of framing forced migrant
livelihoods. Focusing on the income-earning histories of participants, starting from
when they began their process of moving to South Africa to the present day, revealed
that many participants moved frequently between formal and informal income-earning
in order to earn a living. Some participants, particularly men working as casual
labourers, sometimes work simultaneously in both formal and informal economies in
order to make ends meet, and maximise income and networking possibilities. Incomeearning in the informal economy is subject to similar organizational rules as the formal
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economy, in that informal processes determine access to spaces to work and operate,
with their own hierarchies and rules. These govern migrants’ access to the space and
opportunity necessary in order to earn income. While forced migrants may work
casually or informally, the results of their work is a part of the formal economy, whether
in the infrastructure built by casual labourers or in the production of the artisanal crafts
sold in formal, brick and mortar shops.

6.2.3 Instability and Precarity
A consistent theme in conversations with forced migrants was the volatile and unstable
nature of forced migrants’ tenure in the city. This manifested itself in several different
ways, including accessing documentation, social services and housing, as well as in
their income-earning strategies. As discussed in section 3.2, refugees and asylum
seekers experience great difficulty accessing legal documentation, because of the
disorganization and corruption at the Cape Town RRO, which results in long lines and
inconsistent renewal periods. This puts participants’ legal status in regular jeopardy.
While informal and casual labour is to a certain degree unstable by nature, there seemed
to be cyclical dips in business and earnings, as many hawkers, traders and artisans have
built a customer base which consists largely of poor South Africans, who tend to spend
less near the end of the month. Others rely on the highly seasonal tourist economy. In
addition, Cape Town’s xenophobic atmosphere contributes to participants’ feelings of
being physically unsafe as they move throughout the city, which in turn shapes their
experiences of the city, cutting them off from building social networks with South
Africans. While forced migrants have developed a set of tactics to address these strains
and exclusions, such as strict budgeting and individual and community level social
networking, these are not permanent solutions to their chronic instability. Some
participants, such as Claude and Raphael (section 4.2) were able to mobilise local and
transnational social connections in order to maximise their income and access steady
employment in the formal economy. The majority of participants, however, despite
drawing upon a diverse set of entitlements that ranged from various income strategies,
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individual and community links and personal strategies and tactics, could do little to
increase their overall livelihood security.

The three finding chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that there is no simple
solution to the uncertain and vulnerable situation that forced migrants find themselves
in, but rather confirm the fact that the exclusion that participants face is
multidimensional.

6.3 Contributions to the Literature
This thesis joins a significant body of literature that explores the livelihood strategies of
the urban poor, as well as the literature of migrants living in South Africa, and their
struggles to make a place for themselves in the country. It finds that there is no singular
experience of being a forced migrant in Cape Town, and that livelihood strategies are as
diverse as the participants themselves. In considering forced migrant access to the
Department of Home Affairs, this study confirms the work of Amit (2012) and
Vigneswaran, (2008) that corruption and long wait times interfere with participants’
access to legal documentation and formal employment. In considering forced migrants’
relationships to banking, this work builds on the earlier work of Landau et al. (2005),
Jacobsen (2005) and Jacobsen and Bailey (2004). Through a fine-grained consideration
of individual migrants’ struggles, it reveals how the new 2010 FICA regulations, which
interlink legal status with bank accounts, limit forced migrants’ access to formal
banking. Chapter 4 describes the kinds of trades that migrants are generally involved in,
highlighting the hitherto under-researched role that hair salons play in how female
migrants craft their livelihood strategies. In considering the social networks of
participants, the findings of this thesis confirms those of Amisi and Ballard (2005) in
their investigation of Congolese ethnic organizations, in identifying these institutions as
important loci of social networking and informal insurance. In contrast to Nyamnjoh’s
(2014) investigation of Cameroonian migrants living in Cape Town, this thesis found
that Congolese participants contributed and drew upon much smaller amounts of
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money, but did find that, like the associations described by Nyamnjoh, there were few
opportunities for female inclusion in leadership.

6.4 Policy Implications
South Africa’s current legal and banking structure seriously affects forced migrants dayto-day lives, and their abilities to participate in the formal South African economy.
While the entire asylum system needs to be redesigned, simple adaptations, such as
setting a minimum time between permit renewals, for example a year or six months,
instituting a numbering system for appointments, or a by-mail application submission
system for permit renewals could create a more fluid and humane experience for forced
migrants. This thesis also recommends that the South African government reconsider its
banking regulations, and amend FICA guidelines to clearly state that refugees and
asylum seekers are allowed to hold both business and personal accounts.

The findings of this research have revealed interesting policy implications in regards to
the livelihoods of forced migrants. In spite of a burgeoning literature addressing
humanitarian action and urban refugees, there is little evidence from interviews with
participants that such programs play a important role in how forced migrants patch
together their own livelihoods. Indeed, as Landau (2014) suggests, humanitarian aid to
refugees and asylum seekers that is not also available for South Africans could feed into
xenophobic feelings towards foreigners. A closer consideration of Fundi Network's
operating model may be able to offer insight into the kinds of structures that can
empower migrants. Fundi deliberately designs teams that contained both South Africans
and non-South Africans, both highly-skilled and less-skilled labourers, so that labourers
at Fundi were able to learn from each other, and build social networks outside of their
own ethnic affiliations. The informal nature of casual labour allowed participants to
arrange their time, to be able to take care of their documentation issues at the
Department of Home Affairs without jeopardizing their employment. One serious

93

recommendation would be for Fundi to attempt to diversify its opportunities, so that
women may also be able to take better advantage of this program.

6.5 Limitations of the Study
Drawing on a livelihoods approach, the intention of this study was to incorporate the
perspectives of forced migrants on their own livelihoods by considering, on the one
hand, the structural factors that shape their options, while highlighting the agency that
participants have to actively shape their lives through material and non-material assets.
The results of this thesis has the potential to overstate the individual agency that
participants have to shape their lives in contexts of poverty, and I have done my best to
evenly objectively present forced migrants’ livelihoods. With purposive sampling, and
a sample size of only 32 participants, ranging in profession, country of origin, age and
gender, there is little scope to generalize these findings. In choosing respondents, there
is a possibility of missing interesting and useful information from the individuals that I
excluded. With such a diversity of participants, it was sometimes difficult in analysis to
find themes and trends across so many different factors that were meaningful without
being reductionist.

6.6 Future Research Directions
While the field of refugee and forced migrant livelihoods offers a vast array of options
for further research, three avenues would be particularly interesting and worthwhile.
The first is the role that ethnic associations play in forced migrants’ livelihoods. While
Amisi and Ballard have done an extensive investigation into the practices of Congolese
migrants, a fuller exploration of which migrants use these networks, and how widely
these networks are used, and by migrants from which countries, could be explored
further.

A second area of focus is women’s livelihoods, with a particular focus on the role of
hair salons, in order to fill a gap that has not been previously explored, and in order to

94

learn more about an industry that is largely operated by women. Certain questions arise
from a consideration of this particular industry. For instance, what are the trajectories
and qualities of women that start these businesses? How do they raise capital to start
these businesses, and how is this process different from that utilized by their male
counterparts?

Finally, this thesis would not be complete without a call for other migration scholars to
take a more serious look at forced migrants’ access to formal banking. In my search for
literature to contextualize and support my own findings, there were few studies that
review the impact of the new regulations on forced migrants. Such a study could yield
important information and policy recommendations Such a study should consider: How
have the regulations changed since 2010? How many forced migrants use bank
accounts? How many use other forms of banking? How does this affect remittances?

6.7 Final Remarks
Forced migrants come to South Africa hoping to escape the persecution and war they
have experienced in their home countries. Upon arrival, they instead encounter a hostile
country where the unnecessarily difficult bureaucratic structure of Home Affairs traps
them in a cyclical quest to maintain their legal status. While most forced migrants are
able to secure their livelihoods through a combination of formal and informal work and
the power of social networking, few have been able to move beyond mere survivalism.
Even those that are economically successful struggle to access South Africa’s banking
system, and are unable to build equity in the country. These structural constraints,
paired with widespread xenophobia and violence, inspire many participants to dream of
ways to leave South Africa, whether by returning home, or through resettlement. More
than twenty years after the end of apartheid, it seems that South Africa does not yet
belong to all who live in it.
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APPENDIX A: EXCERPT FROM CONGO SQUARE NEWS
Août/August, 2013: 2

TRANSLATION
Alert! Alert! Alert!
Asani, AMIBEK
In less than one month more than four
Congolese (DRC) have been arrested in
supermarkets for stealing products like:
cheese, Pampers [diapers], chocolates
and bottles of whisky. It is true that life
has become difficult, but that does not
justify acts of stealing. It would be best
to use a brother or a social service
organization.
Many of us do not know that Congolese
(DRC) ARE AMONGST THE
FOREIGNERS WITH THE BEST
REPUTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA,
according to the statistics of a group of
lawyers who proved easily that at the
end of the year, they had not had a case
with a Congolese.
Let’s maintain that reputation, as it can
be used, by us and by our children born
in this country.
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APPENDIX B: LETTER FROM FIRST NATIONAL BANK TO ARESTA

CONTACT
INFORMATION
REDACTED

SIGNATURE REDACTED

CONTACT INFORMATION REDACTED
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APPENDIX C: ETHICS APPROVAL

SIGNATURE REDACTED
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APPENDIX D: LETTER OF INFORMATION FOR FORCED MIGRANTS
Livelihood strategies of urban refugees in Cape Town, South Africa
Principal Investigator:
Belinda Dodson, Geography Department, University of Western Ontario
Student Researcher:
Madeleine Northcote, Geography Department, University of Western Ontario
Letter of Information17
My name is Madeleine Northcote, and I am a student at the University of Western
Ontario in Canada. I am here in Cape Town because I am working on a research project
about forced migrants in the city and how they make a living. This letter is meant to
explain my research to you, including what kinds of issues we will talk about, and what
I plan on doing with the information you share with me. This will help you decide
whether you would like to participate.
Cape Town has many forced migrants and refugees, and I am interested in knowing
how these people make a living in the city, and how important self-employment is in
this. I plan on interviewing around 30 individuals who were forced to leave their home
country and now live in Cape Town. In order to participate in an interview, you must
consider yourself to be someone who migrated under forced conditions. You must also
be aged 18 or older, and make at least part of your income through self-employment,
for example in making goods for sale or providing a service for which you are paid.
I would like to know what you do to make a living, what difficulties you encounter in
these activities, and what help or support you receive from other people or
organizations. I would also like to know what some of the biggest challenges are to
living in the city as a migrant, and what things you do to meet these challenges. I will be
talking to men as well as women, and I will also ask you about the different ways that
men and women migrants make a living.
Participation is voluntary, and you may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any
questions or withdraw at any time. If you agree to participate, I will ask you several
questions about how you came to live in Cape Town, your work life and your
experiences living in the city. I hope that you will also tell me about other aspects of
your life in Cape Town that you feel are relevant that I did not think to ask. If there are
any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering, you do not have to. I will not
ask for any identifying information or about your immigrant or refugee status and you
should not tell me anything about your status that might put you at risk. If you think that
talking to me would attract unwanted attention from other people or from authorities
17

Paper copy will be provided to potential participants, and oral version will be
read to any who are illiterate.
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like the police, then it is better that you say no and do not participate. If you do
participate, all your information and answers will be confidential and will be kept either
with me or in a locked location at all times, so no-one else will be able to hear or see
them.
The interview should last about an hour, but you are free to end it at any time. With
your consent, I would like to record the interview with a digital audio recorder. You can
choose to have the recorder turned off at any stage during our conversation. If you do
not want our conversation to be recorded, you can still participate, but I will write down
notes to help me remember what we discussed. The only person who will listen to the
recording or read the notes after our conversation is myself. From what I learn from
these interviews, I will write a thesis about migrants in Cape Town. When I write about
what you have told me, I will never use your name. I will reveal only your age, gender,
where you come from and how you make a living and I will refer to you only by a
made-up name. I will keep all the information on my laptop computer and only I know
the password.
There are some risks you should be aware of. You might lose time by talking to me that
you could have spent working. You can decide when it is convenient for us to talk, and
if you want to pause the interview or must do something else while we are talking you
are free to do so. You can choose whether we do the interview at the place where you
work or at another place, such as at a coffee shop.
Some of the questions may be sensitive, but as I said before, you may choose not to
answer a question and we can move on to the next one. Also, remember that you may
end the interview at any time. You will not benefit directly from participating in this
study but information gathered may help to bring attention to the situation of forced
migrants living in Cape Town, and show that they are working to look after themselves.
After the interview, I will be happy to keep in touch and to tell you about my research
as I make progress. You can reach me by telephone in South African at _________ or in
Canada at ___________ or by email at _______. If you would like to know more about
the research project, you may also contact my supervisor, Dr. Belinda Dodson, in
Canada at __________ or by email at ________. If you have questions about your
rights as a research participant,, please contact the Office of Research Ethics at the
University of Western Ontario in Canada at ___________ or ___________.
Sincerely,
Madeleine Northcote
This letter is yours to keep for future reference.
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APPENDIX E: FORCED MIGRANT ORAL CONSENT FORM

Livelihood strategies of urban refugees in Cape Town, South Africa
Consent Form
I have read or heard the letter of information, have had the nature of the study explained
to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
By way of stating ‘yes’ I indicate my willingness to participate in this survey.

Yes/No

May I continue audio recording our conversation?
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Yes/No

APPENDIX F: QUESTION GUIDE: FORCED MIGRANTS
Clarify that they don’t have to respond to any questions that make them uncomfortable.
1. Are you over 18?
2. Did you come to South Africa because you felt you could not continue living in
your home country?
3. Where are you from?
Probe: What country were you born in? Where did you grow up?
4. Would you consider yourself self-employed?
5. What made you decide to move to South Africa? How long have you lived in
South Africa?
6. Can you tell me about how you came to Cape Town?
7. Tell me more about how you make a living.
Probe: What kind of work do you do?
Probe: If they have a business: What products/services do you sell?
Probe: How do you get your supplies?
Probe: Where do you make most of your sales? Where do you spend most of
your day?
Probe: How long does it take you to get from where you live to where you
normally work?
Probe: Do you work on your own or with other people? Are those people also
immigrants? Are they from the same country as you?
8. Can you describe a typical day to me?
9. What are the major obstacles you encounter in trying to make a living in Cape
Town?
Probe: Are you able to sell/work in the same place regularly?
Probe: Is there a lot of competition for customers?
Probe: Is it difficult to get goods to sell or money to buy stock/make your
products?
Probe: Is it difficult to transport or store goods or money?
10. What are the major problems you face in day-to-day life in Cape Town?
Probe: Do you feel safe where you work?
Probe: Do you feel safe where you live?
Probe: Do you feel safe using public transportation?
Probe: Have you had any experience with authorities (either police or immigration?)
Probe: Have you encountered any negative attitudes or hostility from South Africans or from
other migrants?

11. How do you deal with these challenges? Are there any people who help you?
Probe: Do you have family in the city?
Probe: Are there any migrant or refugee organizations you use?
12. Do you think your experiences would be different if you were a man/woman?
13. What are your hopes for the future? Where do you see yourself in 5 or 10 years?
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